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RECENT CASES
Civil Rights-Desegregation-Busing and the Use of
Racial Quotas in Pupil Assignment Are Constitutionally
Permissible Remedies To Eliminate Racial Segregation
in Dual School Systems
Plaintiff brought a class action against defendant board of educa-
tion' seeking the elimination of racial segregation that allegedly persisted
in the public school system. 2 Although it was agreed between the parties
that the dual school system had not yet been dismantled, 3 the desegrega-
tion proposals that were submitted to the district court differed substan-
tially concerning the techniques to be used in overcoming the system's
racial imbalance, particularly for schools at the elementary level. 4 One
1. Defendant's school system, the forty-third largest in the United States, encompasses the
city of Charlotte and surrounding Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. It covers an area of 550
square miles, spanning roughly 22 miles east-west and 36 miles north-south.
2. Plaintiff originally brought a class action against defendant school board to expedite
integration and prevent unfavorable gerrymandering of school districts. That suit resulted in a
court-ordered plan calling for geographic zoning with a free transfer provision. Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 243 F. Supp. 667 (W.D.N.C. 1965). In September 1968 plaintiff filed
a "motion for further relief" to expedite desegregation and eliminate other racial inequalities.
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 300 F. Supp. 1358 (W.D.N.C. 1969).
3. As a result of the desegregation plan approved in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.
of Educ., 243 F. Supp. 667 (W.D.N.C. 1965), during the 1968-69 school year, 21,000 of 24,000
Negro students attended school within the city of Charlotte, and two-thirds of them attended 21
schools that were either totally Negro or more than 99% Negro. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 300 F. Supp. 1381, 1386 (W.D.N.C. 1969).
4. The district court directed the school board to submit a plan by November 1969 that would
achieve total desegregation for the following school year. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 306 F. Supp. 1291 (W.D.N.C. 1969). The school board's request for extension of time in
submitting that plan was denied, and the board submitted an incomplete plan. Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 306 F. Supp. 1299 (W.D.N.C. 1969). In December 1969 the district
court held the board's plan unacceptable and appointed an expert to prepare a desegregation plan.
It provided for: (1) the modification of the school board's high school plan by busing 300 Negroes
to the nearly all-white Independence High School; (2) the use of the school board's junior high
school plan combined with the use of "satellite" zones, thereby effecting substantial desegregation
of every junior high school in the system; and, (3) the complete revision of the school board's
elementary school zones and extensive busing and pairing of schools, thereby integrating every
elementary school. In February 1970 the district court was presented with a completed school board
plan. The plan called for the closing of 7 schools and the reassignment of their pupils; the restructing
of school attendance zones to achieve greater racial balance; the creation of a single athletic league;
racially mixed faculties; and a majority-to-minority transfer system. On the secondary school level
its effect was to produce a 17% to 36% Negro population in 9 of the high schools with a 2% Negro
population in the tenth, and a Negro population of as high as 38% in 20 junior high schools, with
a 90% Negro population in the twenty-first. On the elementary school level, however, the plan
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proposal, called the "Finger Plan," was drafted by a court appointed
expert, and recommended racial quotas in pupil assignment, geographic
zoning, and busing to achieve the desegregation of virtually all the
schools in the system. Defendant's proposal, in contrast, rejected busing
as a desegregation technique, at least on the elementary school level, and
relied primarily on geographic zoning to achieve racial balance. It failed,
however, to desegregate approximately half of the elementary schools.
Plaintiff maintained that in order to implement full desegregation, bus-
ing and the use of racial quotas in pupil assignment were within the
court's remedial powers under the equal protection clause. Defendant
contended that busing would impose an unreasonable burden upon the
school system, and further asserted that sections 2000c(b) and 2000c-6
of Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 19645 deprived the court of power
to require either the busing or the assignment of students to overcome
racial imbalance in public schools. The district court adopted the Finger
Plan calling for busing and pupil assignment based on racial quotas.6
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's
plan for secondary school desegregation, but vacated and remanded the
portion of the plan dealing with elementary schools, concluding that the
extensive busing placed an unreasonable burden on the school board.7
On remand, after defendant chose not to amend its desegregation pro-
posal, 8 the district court reaffirmed its original desegregation plan., On
produced significantly less desegregation. Utilizing mainly the gerrymandering of school zones, it
resulted in the placement of 50% of the Negro pupils in 9 schools that ranged from 86% to 100%
Negro. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 265 (W.D.N.C. 1970).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c(b) (1964) provides: "'Desegregation' means the assignment of stu-
dents to public schools and within such schools without regard to their race, color, religion, or
national origin, but 'desegregation' shall not mean the assignment of students to public schools in
order to overcome racial imbalance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (1964), authorizing the Attorney Gen-
eral to institute federal suits, provides in part: "[Niothing herein shall empower any official or court
of the United States to issue any order seeking to achieve a racial balance in any school by requiring
the transportation of pupils or students from one school to another or one school district to another
in order to achieve such racial balance, or otherwise enlarge the existing power of the court to insure
compliance with constitutional standards."
6. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 265 (W.D.N.C. 1970).
7. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 431 F.2d 138 (4th Cir.), cert. granted,
399 U.S. 926 (1970) (Supreme Court directed reinstatement of the district court's order pending
further proceedings in the district court).
8. The district court received 2 new plans for the elementary schools: a plan prepared by the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) based on contiL ous zoning of schools, and
a plan proposed by 4 members of the 9-member school board achieving substantially the same result
as the Finger plan but with slightly less busing. A majority of the school bo.- d declined to change
its plan. The district court then gave the school board its choice of the 3 plans other than their
own or the option to submit a new plan. The school board "acquiesced" in the Finger plan.
9. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 318 F. Supp. 786 (W.D.N.C.), cert.
granted, 400 U.S. 802 (1970).
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certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed. When
necessary to eliminate a state imposed dual school system, busing and
the use of racial quotas in pupil assignment are within the district court's
remedial powers under the equal protection clause. Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (197 1).1"
In Brown v. Board of Education," the Supreme Court held that
racial segregation in public schools was unconstitutional because it de-
nied equal protection of the laws to children of a minority group. 12
Following that landmark decision, the Court turned its attention to the
standard of compliance to be applied by the district courts and consid-
ered the immense problems of implementing its desegregation mandate.
It declared in Brown H1' 3 that desegregation was to proceed "with all
deliberate speed"" and placed primary responsibility on school authori-
ties for devising and effectuating desegregation plans. It was only when
school authorities neglected this constitutional duty that the lower courts
were empowered to intervene and impose suitable desegregation reme-
dies of their own.' The response of affected school boards was far from
cooperative. Some devised grade-a-year plans 6 that had little or no
effect on racial balance in most school systems. In addition, many
schools were subject to state enacted pupil placement laws. 17 While these
tactics initially were acceptable as an effort to get the desegregation
process moving, they later were attacked in the courts as ineffective
10. The following cases were argued with the instant case: Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 47 (1971) (Supreme Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction); North
Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971) (North Carolina anti-busing statute held
unconstitutional); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971) (busing and rezoning permitted); Davis
v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33 (1971) (pairing and racial balance quotas held permissi-
ble).
11. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
12. The Brown holding was limited to de jure school segregation, which is segregation that
has the official sanction of state law or is otherwise caused by state action. It is distinguishable
from de facto school segregation, which is attributable to private causes such as housing patterns
or population shifts and not to direct state action. See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C.
1967).
13. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
14. Id. at 299-300.
15. Id. at 300.
16. See, e.g., Maxwell v. County Bd. of Educ., 301 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1962), rev'd on other
grounds, 373 U.S. 683 (1963); Goss v. Board of Educ., 301 F.2d 164 (6th Cir. 1962), rev'd on other
grounds, 373 U.S. 683 (1963).
17. These laws conferred varying degrees of discretion upon either state or local authorities
to assign pupils individually to schools within their system. See Covington v. Edwards, 264 F.2d
780 (4th Cir. 1959) (county board of education considered each student application for transfer on
its individual merits); Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956) (upheld pupil placement
law which required school board to consider the health, safety and general welfare of pupils when
making a student assignment).
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desegregation devices that perpetuated the dual school system.18 Finally,
in Griffin v. County Board,1" the Supreme Court indicated its growing
impatience in the face of this intransigence. Noting the massive resist-
ance to desegregation on the part of state political officials and school
authorities, and recognizing their corresponding failure to provide effec-
tive desegregation plans, the Court concluded that the standard of "all
deliberate speed" was no longer adequate. The same year, Congress
passed the Civil Rights Act of 196420 in an apparent attempt to acceler-
ate compliance by school officials with court desegregation orders. In
one respect the Act clearly created operative procedures because it au-
thorizes the Attorney General to initiate desegregation suits21 and
provides for the termination of financial assistance to school districts
that fail to comply with federal desegregation guidelines.2 2 On the other
hand, it contains some sections that seemingly restrict the remedial au-
thority of federal courts in school cases. These sections provide that the
meaning of desegregation does not include the assignment of students to
overcome racial imbalance and that the Act authorizes neither the courts
nor school officials to order students transported for that purpose.2 In
spite of the efforts by the Court and Congress, very little school desegre-
gation was accomplished. During the years 1963-66, the percentage of
black students in southern states attending schools with white children
rose from slightly more than one percent to six percent.24 Attributable
generally to the passage of the Civil Rights Act and particularly to the
school authorities' fear of losing federal school funds,? the progress
represented by the trend was small in proportion to the amount of
desegregation legally required. As a result, the freedom-of-choice plans
in effect during this period were widely challenged in the courts as inade-
18. Green v. School Bd., 304 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1962) (school assignment of pupils based on
race held invalid); Northcross v. Board of Educ., 302 F.2d 818 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S.
944 (1962) (pupil assignment law was not adequate as a plan for reorganizing schools into a
nonracial system).
19. 377 U.S. 218 (1964). See also Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1964) (opinion
stated that Brown I never contemplated infinite number of delaying tactics to defeat segregation).
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c, 2000d to -4 (1964).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (1964).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-5 (Supp. V, 1970).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c(b) (1964). Courts have concluded that Congress included these provi-
sion to make clear it was not creating a right of action under the fourteenth amendment against de
facto segregation. Contra, Goss v. Board of Educ., 270 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Tenn. 1967). See
generally United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 840 (1967).




quate. 21 In Green v. New Kent County School Board,27 the Supreme
Court assessed the constitutionality of a Virginia freedom-of-choice plan
and noted that instead of producing a unitary school system, the plan
effectively had placed the burden of integration on the black children
who had to elect to go to white schools. In light of the school board's
failure to meet its affirmative duty, the Court declared that the freedom-
of-choice plan had to be replaced by a desegregation plan that was
feasible and promised realistically to work. After the Green Court
handed down its vigorous standard for the evaluation of school desegre-
gation progress, the lower courts began to utilize affirmative integration
plans to remedy past official discrimination. 2 Even so, school board
resistance to any plans that called for extensive busing continued to
impair the speed with which the courts could dismantle dual school
systems. In 1969, the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Holmes County
Board of Education 9 again voiced its impatience with the speed of deseg-
regation. In refusing a Justice Department motion for additional time
to submit a desegregation plan for 33 Mississippi school districts, the
Court declared that school districts were "to terminate dual school
systems at once."'30 Thereafter, increased pressure was brought to bear
on school authorities by the executive branch and the courts to overcome
sham compliance with desegregation orders. The result was that an
increased variety of specific remedial requirements came into use, such
as racial balance quotas, rezoning, pairing of schools, and some busing.3'
Even though lower courts have found these remedial requirements to be
within the Green and Alexander rationale, the Supreme Court had not
yet determined which of them were constitutionally acceptable means of
achieving the unitary school system required by Brown I.
26. E.g., Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968); Raney v. Board of Educ., 391
U.S. 443 (1968).
27. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969) (school
board ordered to move towards goal of racial balance in school faculty); United States v. Jefferson
County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967) (school board required to take affirmative action
to eliminate effects of dual school system).
29. 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
30. Id. at 20.
31. See Felder v. Harnett County Bd. of Educ., 409 F.2d 1070 (4th Cir. 1969) (desegregation
plan required racial balance quotas or pairing of schools); United States v. School Dist. 151, 404
F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968) (bus transportation as a means to eliminate segregation may validly be
employed); Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 364 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1966) (Constitution requires
that teachers be assigned without regard to color). Contra, Goss v. Board of Educ., 270 F. Supp.
903 (E.D. Tenn. 1967) (there is no constitutional right to be bused); Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ.,
369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1966) (board of education has no constitutional
duty to bus black or white children out of their neighborhoods).
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In the instant case, the Court initially reviewed the history of deseg-
regation efforts since the Brown I decision. It pointed out that while for
many years school officials had temporized and openly resisted Brown
I's command to end the dual school system, the Supreme Court had
gradually and necessarily tightened its compliance standards in order to
overcome these tactics. More specifically, it declared that on the basis
of the Green and Alexander decisions, defendant had an affirmative duty
to devise a desegregation plan that was feasible and capable of immedi-
ate enforcement. Concluding that defendant had defaulted in this re-
spect,3 1 the Court reasoned that the instant case was an appropriate one
for judicial intervention and for the exercise of broad equitable powers
in fashioning a desegregation remedy. Turning its attention to the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the Court rejected defendant's argument that the
Act limited the power of the federal courts to deal with segregation in
the schools. In its view, the Act imposed no such limitation, but instead
defined the existing powers of federal courts to implement Brown I's
mandate. It explained further that the Act's apparent ban against the
use of student assignment and busing as desegregation techniques was,
in actuality, merely a legislative attempt to make clear that no right of
action existed under the fourteenth amendment against de facto segrega-
tion.? In its analysis of the specific desegregation remedies in question,
the Court found that while the Constitution did not require the use of
quotas in regulating the racial composition of schools, their use was a
helpful starting point in making the transition from a dual to a unitary
school system. 34 It added, however, that in some cases the existence of
one-race schools would be tolerated as long as school officials could
meet the burden of showing that those schools do not result from present
or past official discrimination. Continuing its analysis, the Court held
that even though defendant's pupil assignment plan was racially neutral,
it was nonetheless unacceptable because it failed to counteract effectively
the lingering vestiges of past school desegregation. Accordingly, the
remedial alteration of attendance zones was upheld by the Court as
another reasonable method of overcoming racial imbalance. Finally, the
32. See note 4 supra.
33. Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was not designed to restrict the courts' historic
equitable powers. However, Title IV's legislative history indicates Congress' concern that someone
would read the Act as creating a right of action under the fourteenth amendment where so-called
"de facto segregation" existed-where there was a racial imbalance but no proof that it was caused
by the discriminatory action of state or local officials. Hence, §§ 2000c(b) and 2000c-6 of Title
IV were added to foreclose such an interpretation, but neither expanded nor withdrew any remedial
powers from the courts.
34. The Finger plan called for a ratio of 71% white to 29% black in the school system.
[Vol. 241248
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Court addressed the question of the permissibility of busing and found
that it too was an acceptable method for dismantling the dual school
system. In making that determination, the Court acknowledged the le-
gitimate concern for student health and safety and the potential burden
that busing would impose upon defendant's system. It refused, however,
to give those considerations overriding effect.3 Summarizing its posi-
tion, the Court held that since the desegregation plan adopted by the
district court was neither unreasonable nor unworkable, it should be
affirmed in its entirety.
The importance of the instant decision stems more from the public
controversy that has arisen than from strictly legal questions concerning
the soundness of its reasoning and conclusions. Indeed, from a legal
standpoint, the instant Court's approval of busing and the use of racial
quotas follows quite logically from the rationale of prior desegregation
decisions that have grown out of Brown . During the years immediately
following Brown I, the Supreme Court's desegregation mandate met
open resistance and ingenious methods of circumvention.36 As a result,
the Court was forced to impose increasingly more rigorous standards of
compliance upon the school boards. For example, it abandoned the
relatively moderate freedom-of-choice plan in favor of desegregation
proposals that called for affirmative action to create racial balance in
the schools.37 In the same vein, it declared that mere racial neutrality on
the part of school officials would not be enough to satisfy Brown I
because, for all practical purposes, the school systems operating under
that standard remained segregated. The instant decision is just the latest
phase in the Supreme Court's long search for a key to the desegregation
problem. In this decision, more than in any other, the Court has at-
tempted to establish guidelines that lower courts can employ to dictate
the detailed organizational and administrative changes constitutionally
required to remedy the effects of a dual school system. 38 For the present
at least, its impact should be to accelerate the pace of desegregation in
35. This conclusion by the Court can best be understood through an examination of defen-
dant school board's past practices. In 1966-67, the school system, without regard to desegregation
plans, intended to bus approximately 23,000 students for an average daily round trip of 15 miles.
More elementary school children than junior and senior high school students were to be bused and
children 4-5 years of age were to travel the longest routes. The district court estimated that the
Finger plan would require an additional 138 buses, but 105 of those buses were already available
and 22 more had already been ordered. These busing facilities existed in part because North
Carolina requires transportation for all children who live more than one and one-half miles from
school. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-186(b) (1966).
36. See notes 16 & 17 supra.
37. See note 27 supra.
38. See note 31 supra.
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many states primarily because the lower courts will be less reluctant
from a legal standpoint to utilize busing and racial quotas to achieve the
racial balance called for in Brown J.31 Evidence of this already can be
seen in the many school systems currently subject to massive busing
orders.4 0 Regardless of the early indications of compliance, however, it
is still premature to conclude that the Supreme.Court has taken a signifi-
cant stride toward the elimination of the dual school system, and toward
the realization of equal educational opportunity. In view of the current
public response to the instant decision, the opposite conclusion seems to
be the more likely result. The controversy revolves around one central
point: busing and the use of racial quotas are highly unpopular mea-
sures, especially among whites .4 As the ultimate desegregation weapons
in a court's arsenal, they unquestionably will have a dramatic impact
upon every community in which they are used, potentially affecting every
school age child, irrespective of wealth, race, or place of residence. It is
this prospect that most alarms opponents of busing and racial quotas.
Not only does it prompt them to withdraw their children from the
schools, but it also might influence them to withdraw their leadership
and financial support from public education altogether. Worse still, if
whites continue to abandon the public schools, the schools will be unable
to promote the interaction among students of different races that Brown
I found to be so essential to the development of racial tolerance and a
sense of equality in a democratic society. In short, the side effects of
assaulting racial discrimination in the public schools are jeopardizing
the very goal of equal educational opportunity that is being sought. This
is the underlying irony of the desegregation movement, and the courts
are now caught squarely in the dilemma. Constitutionally bound to
dismantle the dual school system, they possess desegregation weapons
that they dare not use to the fullest extent for fear of destroying the good,
characteristics of public schools along with the bad.
Given this perspective, it is crucially important for lower courts to
examine the instant decision to find a permissible basis for alternatives
to busing and the use of racial quotas. Even if this were not dictated by
the counterproductiveness of using these two measures, it eventually
would be forced upon the courts because of the immense administrative,
economic, and physical problems involved in trying to reorganize a
school system along nonracial lines. Some school systems, mainly those
39. N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1971, at 25, col. 1.
40. N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1971, § 4, at 1, col. 1.
41. Squires, Needed: U.S. Policy on School Busing, The Nashville Tennessean, Sept. 5, 1971,
§ B, at 1, col. 5.
1250 [Vol. 24
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near larger cities, may face insuperable time problems in transporting
students long distances between home and school; in that situation some-
thing less than perfect racial balance would have to satisfy the courts.
A more critical and typical problem, however, is the lack of resources
to finance such a school reorganization; particularly where massive bus-
ing is required. This latter problem, while not overwhelming in the in-
stant case,42 is beginning to loom larger elsewhere in the country. In
Corpus Christi, Texas, for example, the school board maintains that it
cannot afford the 125 buses needed to comply with a district court
busing order. 3 A very similar problem exists in Pontiac, Michigan.4
While it was thought at one time that federal funds could be used to
alleviate this problem, no relief for local school boards appears to be
forthcoming from that source. In fact, President Nixon has instructed
Secretary Richardson to prohibit the use of funds from the Emergency
School Assistance Act for the purpose of busing. 5 In view of the bur-
geoning problems associated with busing and the use of racial quotas,
the development of alternative desegregation measures" should proceed
as rapidly as possible. 7 One possible alternative measure would be to
draw school zones so that they cut across racially impacted residential
areas; another would be to build new schools in strategic locations to
serve students of both races. 8 Whatever form they take, these measures,
at the very least, must be capable of achieving an enduring state of
desegregation in the schools. At the very best, they should be capable of
translating the elusive ideal of equal educational opportunity into a
reality for children of minority groups.
42. See note 35 supra.
43. Wall Street J., Aug. 20, 1971, at 1, col. 3.
44. N.Y. Times, May 29, 1971, at 17, col. 3.
45. TuME, Aug. 16, 1971, at 10.
46. In Dallas, Texas, for example, the court approved a plan that called for the creation of
a $15 million television network that would connect elementary classrooms and allow the children
to have daily one-hour sessions from a similar class in a school dominated by a different race. In
addition, the plan provided that any student who volunteered for the majority-to-minority transfer
program would be rewarded with a 4-day school week. TIME, Aug. 16, 1971, at 11.
47. Fortunately, there are signs that the Supreme Court will be amenable to this shift in
approach; it set no ironclad standard requiring the creation of absolute racial balance in the public
schools.
48. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 25, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.
of Educ., 402 U.S. I (1971).
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Civil Rights-Section 1983-Municipality Subject to
Section 1983 Damage Suit if Local Law Recognizes
Municipal Liability
Plaintiff brought suit for damages in federal court against defend-
ant, the District of Columbia,' under section 1983 of Title 42, United
States Code,2 when defendant's allegedly inadequate training and super-
vision of its policemen resulted in the deprivation of plaintiff's constitu-
tional rights.3 Plaintiff contended that he was arrested by one of defend-
ant's policemen without probable cause and with excessive force., Al-
though local law recognized municipal liability, 5 defendant argued that
the municipality was not within the meaning of a "person" against
whom liability can be imposed by section 1983, and it, therefore, moved
for dismissal on the ground of sovereign immunity. The trial court
dismissed the complaint without opinion. On appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, held, reversed
and remanded. When local law recognizes municipal liability, a cause
of action under section 1983 for deprivation of civil rights will lie against
the municipality. Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 197 l)peti-
tion for cert. filed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3308 (U.S. Sept. 26, 1971) (No.
71-564).
Section 1983, originally enacted as the first section of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871,6 established a broad civil remedy against "every
1. In addition to the District of Columbia, 3 other defendants were named in plaintiff's
complaint: District of Columbia policeman Carlson, precinct captain Prete, and Police Chief
Layton. Plaintiff sought to hold Carlson liable for assault and battery or negligence in making the
arrest, and Prete and Layton liable for negligent training and supervision. Plaintiff sought to hold
the District of Columbia liable for the tortious conduct of its officers under the theory of respondeat
superior, and for its own negligence regarding the supervision and training of its officers. In each
instance, plaintiff asserted both a common law tort theory of liability and a claim for deprivation
of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). This Comment concerns only the § 1983 claim
against the District for its negligent training and supervision.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964): "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
3. While the specific constitutional violation asserted by plaintiff is not mentioned, the court
discusses the fouth amendment protection against illegal search and seizure.
4. The complaint alleged that officer Carlson arrested plaintiff in a Washington, D.C. bar
in 1968 without probable cause, and that the officer beat plaintiff with brass knuckles. For the
purpose of testing the sufficiency of the complaint, the court assumed these allegations to be true.
5. Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971) petition for cert. filed, 40 U.S.L.W.
3308 (U.S. Sept. 26, 1971) (No. 71-564).
6. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13. This Act acquired the popular name, the
Ku Klux Act, since it was the major congressional response to the chaos and violence that accompa-
nied reconstruction in the South. In fact it was labelled a bill "To enforce the provisions of the
14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States." H.R. REP. No. 320, 42d Cong., 1st
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person" who, while acting "under color of" state law, deprives another
person of his rights under the Constitution or laws.' Although it was
originally construed narrowly," section 1983 recently has been ihter-
preted to include a multiplicity of situations, precipitating a marked
increase in litigation under its provisions.' This judicial expansion of
section 1983 was based on the section's underlying policies: 10 first, to
override certain kinds of state law; 1 second, to provide a remedy when
state law was inadequate; and third, to provide a federal remedy when
the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in prac-
tice.12 The breadth of section 1983 has been limited by the denotation of
the statutory phrase "every person," whose meaning was derived from
the extensive legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 187 1.'3 The
early debates questioned congressional ability to impose liability upon
towns and counties 4 as was suggested in the Sherman amendment 15 to
the Act. It was felt that "Congress has no constitutional power to
impose any obligation upon county and town organizations, the mere
instrumentality for the administration of state law."' 16 Following two
House rejections of modified versions, the Sherman amendment was
replaced by section six of the Act of April 20, 1871, which imposed
liability on "any person" who has knowledge of the specific wrongs
being committed in deprivation of one's constitutional rights.'7 While
numerous lower court decisions had held that municipalities were not
Sess. (1871). For a general history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and its subsequent history see
Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. Rav. 277
(1965); Comment, Federal Comity, Official Immunity, and the Dilemma of Section 1983, 1967
DUKE L.J. 740.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
8. For a discussion of the early interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 see Shapo,
supra note 6. Only within the past 25 years have damage suits based upon § 1983 been sought
against municipalities and other public entities. See cases cited note 18 infra.
9. 1970 DIRECTOR OF ADM. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ANN. REP., table 12b;
see Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 72 HARV. L. REV.
1486 (1969). It is interesting to note that United States Code Annotated reports only 19 decisions
litigated under § 1983 in the first 65 years after its adoption. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1964).
Recent developments have extensively broadened the application of § 1983 as evidenced by the
volume of cases reported in United States Code Annotated.
10. For a discussion of these policies see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
11. What the Monroe Court meant by "certain kinds of state law" has never been discussed
in subsequent opinions. It appears that this phrase was used to denote state law that contradicts or
inadequately protects federal civil rights. A study of the factual situations in the § 1983 cases may
give rise to an operational definition of this phrase.
12. 365 U.S. at 173-74; see McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 671-72(1963).
13. See materials cited note 6 supra.
14. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 800-21 (1871).
15. Id. at 663.
16. Id. at 804.
17. Id. This section is now 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1964).
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"persons" for the purposes of section 1983,8 the Supreme Court did not
consider municipal liability under section 1983 until 1961 in Monroe v.
Pape.9 The Court then held that although section 1983 provides a fed-
eral remedy for the deprivation of federal rights and is supplementary
to state remedies, it should be interpreted with reference to concepts of
common-law tort liability.2 ° Furthermore, the Court, looking solely to
the debates and resolution concerning the Sherman amendment, con-
cluded, in pari materia, that, because the response to the Sherman pro-
posal had been so antagonistic, the word "person" in the final text
clearly was not intended to include municipalities. 21 This exemption of
municipalities has been broadened to the point that most entities which
are not human beings are excluded from section 1983 liability. 2 Conse-
quently, it has been held that cities,2 counties,24 and states are outside
the purview of the section.26 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit in Brown v.
Town of Caliente,2 extended the exact Monroe holding to bar a section
1983 action against a municipality even though local law recognized
municipal liability.28 The Brown decision did not, however, consider the
18. See, e.g., Cuiska v. City of Mansfield, 250 F.2d 700 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356
U.S. 937 (1958) (governmental immunity of municipalities not abrogated by Civil Rights Act);
Hewitt v. City of Jacksonville, 188 F.2d 423 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 835 (1951) ("person"
as used in Civil Rights Act does not include a state or its governmental subdivisions); Bomar v.
Keyes, 162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825 (1947) (City of New York not a "person"
under Civil Rights Act).
19. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Plaintiff's complaint alleged that 13 Chicago policemen broke into
his home without a search warrant and ransacked his home while his entire family was made to
stand naked in the living room. Then plaintiff was taken to a police station and detained on "open"
charges for 10 hours without arraignment before a magistrate or without being allowed to phone
his family or an attorney. The City of Chicago as well as the policemen were named as defendants
under § 1983. Municipal liability was not recognized in the jurisdiction.
20. Id. at 180, 183, 187.
21. Id. at 191.
22. See, e.g., Zuckerman v. Appellate Div., 2d Dep't, Sup. Ct., 421 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1970)
(state court not a "person"). See also Kates, Suing Municipalities and Other Public Entities Under
the Federal Civil Rights Act, 4 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 177 (1970). Some public entities, however,
such as school boards, have been deemed to be "persons" under § 1983. See, e.g., Harkless v.
Sweeny Independent School Dist., 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971)
(equitable relief for reinstatement and back pay granted).
23. E.g., Brown v. Town of Caliente, 392 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1968); Fisher v. City of New
York, 208 F. Supp. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
24. E.g., Stevenson v. Sanders, 311 F. Supp. 683 (W.D. Ky. 1970).
25. E.g., Diamond v. Pitchess, 411 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1969); Penn v. Stumpf, 308 F. Supp.
1238, 1240-41 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
26. See generally Kates, supra note 22. It must be noted, however, that injunctive relief has
been granted under § 1983 against a municipality. See. e.g., Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d
1037, 1039 (10th Cir. 1970).
27. 392 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1968).
28. 392 F.2d at 547; see Wilcher v. Gain, 311 F. Supp. 754,755 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
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relevance of section 1988 of Title 42, United States Code, 29 which has
been interpreted to permit the incorporation of local rules into federal
statutes when the former better serve the policies of the federal civil
rights statutes.30 Thus the only recourse under section 1983 for an ag-
grieved party seeking damages has been an action against an individual,
such as a policeman, 31 warden, 32 or other public official,3 who violates
the plaintiff's civil rights "under color of" local law.u
In the instant case, the court initially acknowledged that Monroe
v. Pape is generally cited as authority for the proposition that no damage
suit against a municipality is authorized under section 1983. The court
emphasized, however, that in Monroe, unlike the case at bar, municipal
liability was not recognized by local law. The court noted a threefold
significance to this distinction. First, the court reasoned that the con-
gressional intent behind the Civil Rights Act of 1871, as interpreted in
Monroe,35 was not to legislate municipal liability but to defer to local
law regarding this liability. Therefore, the court concluded that local
laws which recognize municipal liability should control the scope of
liability under section 1983. Secondly, the court recognized that the
application of local laws of municipal liability to section 1983 is consist-
ent with section 1988.36 Thirdly, the court found that Congress's control
over the District of Columbia precludes any interference with a state's
exclusive power to impose municipal liability. The court therefore con-
cluded that the Supreme Court's decision in Monroe should be limited
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1964): "The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on
the district courts by the provisions of this chapter and Title 18, for the protection of all persons in
the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in
conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same
into effect; but in all cases where they are not adopted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions
necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modi-
fied and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction
of such civil or criminal case is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution
and laws of the United States, shall be extended to govern the said courts in the trial and disposition
of the cause, and if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on the party found
guilty." The court's comparison of § 1983 with § 1988 is an approach that neither the Monroe
court nor the plaintiff utilized.
30. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 240 (1969).
31. See. e.g., Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (10th Cir. 1963).
32. See, e.g., Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415 (D. Md. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
877 (1967).
33. See, e.g., Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863, 880-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
34. Kates, supra note 22. See also Shapo, supra note 6.
35. 365 U.S. at 187-92.
36. See materials cited note 29 supra. The court cited Sul!ivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396
U.S. 229, 240 (1969), for the proposition that either federal or state law rules on damages may be
used, whichever better serves the policies of the federal statutes. See Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d
401,409 (5th Cir. 1961).
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to cases in which municipal liability is not recognized by local law and
remanded the case for a determination on the merits of the section 1983
claim.
By incorporating into section 1983, local law that permits recourse
against the resources of the municipality, the instant case has preserved
the fundamental congressional intent to afford adequate redress for the
deprivation of an individual's civil rights. While the modest incomes and
assets of most civil servants could not satisfy a substantial 61aim under
section 1983, the more sizeable resources of the municipality could
provide this redress37 when its negligence is shown to have precipitated
the deprivation of the claimant's .constitutional rights. By removing the
burden of singular liability from the individual employee in these situa-
tions, the instant solution seems more desirable than that of Monroe and
Brown. Moreover, the imposition of municipal liability not only will
help to insure recovery on a valid claim, but should encourage munici-
palities to intensify the screening, training, and supervision of its em-
ployees. Perhaps the most significant element of the instant decision,
however, is its incorporation of local tort law into section 1983 by means
of section 1988. This seemingly novel methodology, explicitly adopted
in this case, appears to have implicit authority in the Monroe decision.
The Court in Monroe noted that while section 1983 represents a federal
remedy supplementary to a state remedy, it should be viewed against the
background of common-law tort liability.38 Thus, without express refer-
ence to section 1988, Monroe assents to structuring potential municipal
liability under section 1983 around local rules of tort liability. Therefore,
whether a municipality can be sued under section 1983 is dependent upon
the sovereign immunity law of the jurisdiction in which the case is
commenced. In addition to an obvious impairment of uniformity in
recovery against municipalities, the method adopted by the instant court
makes the definition of "person" depend upon local rather than federal
interpretation. This rule threatens the policy of section 1983 to provide
a supplementary remedy to inadequate state law. 39 Under the instant
court's approach, a section 1983 suit against a municipality is only as
adequate as the local remedy; it is coextensive with, rather than supple-
mentary to, local remedies. The wisdom of this method is particularly
questionable since it threatens to subject a remedy for constitutional
37. See Kates, supra note 22. It must be noted, however, that the financial crises being
experienced by many cities question their ability to provide adequate recompense to the aggrieved
party. Yet, however severe the municipality's financial condition may appear, satisfaction of a.
substantial claim against a municipality appears much more probable than against a public servant.
38. 365 U.S. at 187.
39. Id. at 183.
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deprivations to local tort law disparities.4 0 The variation in the vindica-
tion of abridged constitutional rights introduced by the instant decision
and the current split between the Ninth Circuit in Brown and the instant
court suggests the need for precise clarification of the interrelationship
of federal and local tort law under section 1983. Clarification by legisla-
tive action or distinct judicial guidelines should provide either the express
inclusion or exclusion of municipalities as "persons" under section 1983.
In reaching this determination, it is critically important to note that
while Congress did not intend to legislate municipal liability, the para-
mount congressional concern was to provide an adequate and consistent
remedy for the deprivation of a claimant's constitutional rights.
Constitutional Law-Citizenship-Statute that
Conditions Retention of United States Citizenship upon
Residency Requirement Is Constitutional When
Citizenship Is Not Protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment Citizenship Clause
Plaintiff, a citizen of both Italy and the United States,' forfeited his
American citizenship2 by failing to comply with section 301(b) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. 3 Section 301 (b) provides that
40. See generally Shapo, supra note 6. This excellent discussion of § 1983 analyzes the
interrelationship of local and federal law in the federal civil rights statutes. It suggests that § 1983
is a federal tort remedy for the deprivation of rights that may or may not be included in the rights,
privileges, and immunities of the United States Constitution.
I. Plaintiff, Mario Aldo Bellei, born in Italy in 1939 of an Italian father and a native-born
American mother, became a citizen of both countries at birth.
2. Although there is a definitional distinction between the terms "citizenship" and "national-
ity" and between "citizen" and "national," the terms are employed interchangeably for the
purposes of this Comment.
3. Section 301(b) provides that: "Any person who is a national and a citizen of the United
States at birth under paragraph (7) of subsection (a) of this section shall lose his nationality and
citizenship unless he shall come to the United States prior to attaining the age of twenty-three years
and shall immediately following any such coming be continuously physically present in the United
States for at least five years: Provided, That such physical presence follows attainment of the age
of fourteen years and precedes the age of twenty-eight years." 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1964). Section
301(a)(7) provides that "the following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth:
(7) a person born outside the geographical limits of the United States and its outlying possessions
of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the
birth of such person, was physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a
period or periods totaling not less than ten years, at least five of which were after attaining the age
of fourteen years ....
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although a foreign-born child of an American citizen acquires United
States citizenship at birth, he must live within the United States continu-
ously for at least five years between the ages of fourteen and twenty-eight
in order to retain that citizenship. 4 Plaintiff sought to enjoin the Secre-
tary of State from enforcing section 301 (b) and asked the federal court
to declare the section unconstitutional on the ground that the provision
was violative of his fifth amendment due process rights.5 A three-judge
district court6 granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and
held section 301 (b) unconstitutional on due process grounds.7 On appeal
to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed. Congress may im-
pose a residency requirement as a condition subsequent to its statutory
grant of citizenship when this citizenship is neither included under nor
protected by the fourteenth amendment citizenship clause. Rogers v.
Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
The citizenship clause of the fourteenth amendment, which desig-
nates as citizens persons born or naturalized in the United States and
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,8 represents the first and
only constitutional definition of United States citizenship. Four statutes
conferring citizenship upon the foreign-born child of an American citi-
zen had been enacted by Congress at the time of the ratification of the
fourteenth amendment in 1868, and four of these statutes were enacted
subsequent to the amendment's ratification.9 As a necessary concomi-
tant to its power to confer derivative citizenship,10 Congress consistently
4. Although plaintiff never resided permanently in the United States, he traveled on an
American passport and registered with the Selective Service System in the United States. Plaintiff
was warned on several occasions that be would have to fulfill the residency requirement imposed
by § 301(b) or forfeit his citizenship. When plaintiff applied for a renewal of his United States
passport in 1964, the Department of State refused his application on the ground that plaintiff had
forfeited his American citizenship by virtue of § 301(b).
5. Plaintiff also alleged that enforcement of § 301(b) was violative of both the punishment
clause of the eighth amendment and of the ninth amendment.
6. Bellei v. Rusk, 296 F. Supp. 1247 (D.D.C. 1969).
7. The district court concluded that "Congress may not proceed by granting citizenship, and
then either qualifying the grant by creating a second-class citizenship or terminating the grant."
Id. at 1252.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
9. Act of Mar. 26, 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 103; Act of Jan. 29, 1795, § 3, 1 Stat. 414; Act of
Apr. 14, 1802, § 4, 2 Stat. 153; Act of Feb. 10, 1855, § 1, 10 Stat. 604, (later codified as REV.
STAT. § 1993; Act of Mar. 2, 1907, § 6, 34 Stat. 1229; Act of May 24, 1934, § 1, 48 Stat. 797;
Act of Oct. 14, 1940, 54 Stat. 1137. Each of the above statutes, which conferred citizenship upon
the foreign-born children of American citizens, attached one or more conditions-both conditions
precedent and subsequent-to the citizenship grant. All required residence of a parent in the United
States before derivative citizenship could vest. The Acts of 1907 and 1934 required oaths of alle-
giance, and the Acts of 1934 and 1940 required 5 years continuous residence in the United States.
10. Derivative citizenship is a form of indirectly conferred citizenship. In the principal case,
plaintiff's citizenship was derived from or through his mother's American citizenship. The corn-
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has imposed conditions, both precedent and subsequent, upon its statu-
tory grant of citizenship to an American citizen's foreign-born child.
Although the Supreme Court generally has upheld the validity of these
conditional-grant statutes," its treatment of the congressional power to
withdraw citizenship once granted has been less predictable. In Perez v.
Brownell,'2 for example, a closely divided Court upheld the authority of
Congress to revoke an individual's American citizenship when the citizen
had voted in a foreign election.'3 In a rigorous dissent, Chief Justice
Warren agreed that United States citizenship could be voluntarily relin-
quished and admitted that certain other acts in derogation of undivided
loyalty to the United States could result in expatriation," but he firmly
asserted that the power to denationalize was within neither the letter nor
the spirit of the powers with which Government was endowed. 5 The
mon-law concept of derivative citizenship of a foreign-born child of a citizen is based upon a
statutory enunciation of this principle. A Statute of Those that be Born Beyond the Sea, 25 Edw.
III, stat. 2 (1350). See Calvin's Case, 2 Howell's State Trials 575, 585 (1608) (holding that all
children of subjects of the King are ipso facto citizens was based upon argument that 25 Edw. III,
stat. 2 (1350), was declarative of the common law); De Geer v. Stone, 22 Ch. D. 243, 247 (1875)
(one born in Holland held to have been a British subject by common law as declared by 25 Edw.
11I, stat. 2 (1350)); Ludlam v. Ludlam, 26 N.Y. 356, 363 (1863) (25 Edw. III, stat. 2 (1350) asserted
as declaratory of the common law of derivative citizenship). One commentator, however, hypothes-
ized that without a statutory grant, foreign-born children of citizens could not derive American
citizenship through their parents and that derivative citizenship had no relation to the common law.
See Alienigenae of the United States, 2 AM. L. REGISTER 193 (1854). The Supreme Court adopted
this latter view in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). In that case, the Court
held that a foreign-born child of an American citizen could himself become a citizen only through
the legislative authority of Congress. Id. at 702.
11. See, e.g., Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308 (1961) (citizenship denied since father was
not citizen at time of plaintiff's birth); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931) (oath of
allegiance to the United States as condition precedent to the granting of citizenship upheld as valid);
United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929) (denial of citizenship upheld when plaintiff's
general citizenship qualifications were doubted); Maney v. United States, 278 U.S. 17 (1928)
(citizenship voidable because of jurisdictional defect); Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657 (1927)
(derivative citizenship descends only if father was United States resident prior to child's birth). See
also Lee You Fee v. Dulles, 236 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1956), revd per curiam on confession of error,
355 U.S. 61 (1957) (upheld validity of § 301(g), which imposed a condition subsequent similar
to § 301(b)).
12. 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
13. Other acts that, if voluntarily undertaken by an American citizen, would result in revoca-
tion of citizenship include: leaving the country in time of war or national emergency in order to
avoid the draft; serving in the armed forces of a foreign nation; and making a formal renunciation
of United States citizenship. 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1964); see notes 14 & 15 infra and accompanying
text.
14. See, e.g., Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491 (1950) (citizenship forfeited by
obtaining foreign citizenship through naturalization); Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915)
(citizenship forfeited by marriage to foreign national).
15. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64-66 (1958). Having concluded that Congress could not
impose involuntary expatriation, Chief Justice Warren attempted to establish a standard for volun-
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influence of this dissent was evidenced by the Court's limited but imme-
diate departures from Perez, invalidating, on a case-by-case basis, cer-
tain involuntary expatriation provisions of the nationality acts."6 In one
case,' 7 for example, the Court invalidated provisions that provided for
denationalization of persons leaving the country in time of war or na-
tional emergency to evade the draft. Similarly, the Court in Schneider
v. Rusk" held that a provision allowing the involuntary expatriation of
only naturalized, as opposed to native-born, citizens, was violative of the
due process clause of the fifth amendment because it discriminated un-
reasonably against naturalized citizens. The Court, however, avoided a
general repudiation of Perez and offered no redefinition of congressional
authority to withdraw citizenship. More recently, in Afroyim v. Rusk,"
the Court overruled Perez v. Brownell and intimated that it was embrac-
ing the doctrine expressed by Chief Justice Warren in his Perez dissent.
The Court in Afroyim relied upon legislative 20 and judicial21 assertions
denying the existence of a congressional power to withdraw citizenship
and upon the absence of an express constitutional grant of congressional
expatriation power, to conclude that the citizenship clause of the four-
teenth amendment not only controls the status and scope of American
citizenship, but also prohibits Congress from imposing involuntary re-
linquishments of this citizenship.22
tary relinquishment. He argued that before voluntary relinquishment could be found, a citizen's
conduct must invariably involve a dilution of undivided allegiance sufficient to indicate voluntary
abandonment of citizenship. Id. at 66-69.
16. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964) (invalidated § 352(a)(1) of the 1952 Act, which
provided for denationalization of naturalized American citizens who resided for 3 or more years in
the country of their former nationality); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963)
(invalidated § 401(j) of the 1940 Act and § 349(a)(10) of the 1952 Act, which provided for dena-
tionalization of persons leaving the country in time of war or national emergency to evade the draft).
It is interesting to note that in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), decided the same day as Perez,
the Court, in a plurality opinion, held that the use of denationalization as a punishment was barred
by the punishment clause of the eighth amendment.
17. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
18. 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
19. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
20. Congress, in 1794, 1797, and 1818, considered and rejected proposals to enact laws that
would have described specified conduct as resulting in involuntary expatriation. Id. at 257.
21. "The simple power of the national Legislature, is to prescribe a uniform rule of naturali-
zation, and the exercise of this power exhausts it, so far as respects the individual." Osborn v. Bank
of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 827 (1824) (dictum). The Court in Osborn was
concerned with defining the powers of the Bank of the United States, and the statement relating to
citizenship was directed toward refuting an analogy drawn between naturalization and the incorpo-
ration of a bank. In so doing, the Court declared that a constitutional distinction could not be
upheld between native-born and naturalized citizens.
22. The Afroyim decision has been criticized, however, for its vague description of voluntary
relinquishment and its seemingly indefinite scope. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81
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Distinguishing Afroyim and Schneider, the instant Court initially
found that in those cases the protection of the fourteenth amendment
citizenship clause was applicable because both plaintiffs were within the
definition of a citizen stated in the first sentence of that amendment. z3
Since the instant plaintiff was neither born nor naturalized in the United
States and was not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, the
Court reasoned that the basis of his citizenship was statutory rather than
constitutional, and that therefore he was not entitled to the protection
of the citizenship clause. Analyzing the judicial and legislative history
of statutory citizenship grants, the Court confirmed congressional power
to confer citizenship upon the foreign-born children of American citi-
zens .2 The Court then focused upon the narrow issue of whether Con-
gress could impose conditions subsequent to a grant of citizenship. Find-
ing no logical distinction between conditions precedent and subsequent,
the instant Court reasoned that in the absence of citizenship clause
protection, there should be no constitutional distinction between these
two concepts.21 Finally, noting the potential value of residency require-
ments in preventing problems of dual nationality, the Court concluded
that the imposition of these requirements as a condition subsequent to
granting derivative citizenship was not unreasonable, arbitrary, unlaw-
ful, or unconstitutional.26
Although the instant Court based its decision upon fourteenth
amendment grounds, section 301 (b) was initially challenged by the plain-
tiff and held unconstitutional by the district court as violative of the fifth
amendment due process clause. It is appropriate, therefore, to consider
the due process ramifications of this provision's constitutionality, even
HARV. L. REV. 69, 138 (1967); 17 BUFFALO L. RV. 925, 935 (1968); 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 824, 826
(1969). The Attorney General and the Department of State, moreover, have concluded that the
Afroyim rule is inapplicable to controversies arising under § 301(b). See 17 BUFFALO L. REV. 925,
935 (1968).
23. The first sentence of the fourteenth amendment provides that: "All persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
24. Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 831 (1971). The Court reviewed the statutory history of
congressional grants of citizenship, pointing out that the Court has specifically recognized the power
of Congress not to grant a United States citizen the right to transmit citizenship by descent. Until
the 1934 Act, the transmission of citizenship to one born abroad was limited to the child of a
qualifying American father and withheld entirely from the child of an American mother and an
alien father.
25. Id. at 834-35. Essential to this conclusion was the Court's refusal to extend the rules of
Schneider and Afroyim to citizenship not based upon the fourteenth amendment citizenship clause.
The Court contended that the 2 earlier cases were based on the fourteenth amendment, but that




though these were artfully avoided zr by the Court in the principal case.
By its declaration that some citizens-the first-sentence-fourteenth-
amendment citizens-are protected by the fourteenth amendment citi-
zenship clause, while other. citizens are not afforded this protection by
reason of the circumstances of their birth, the Court established a classi-
fication that subjects the latter category to.involuntary denationali-
zation. This classification raises a dangerous double standard because
it limits the scope of the Afroyim rule against involuntary expatriation
to native-born and naturalized citizens, thereby imposing a voidable
second-class citizenship upon citizens whose status is derived from a
statutory grant of Congress. Since citizenship constitutes the right to
secure other rights under the sovereign authority, 28 the Court's decision
places these statutory citizens in the anomalous position of possessing
constitutionally protected rights, 29 but of having no constitutionally pro-
tected right to obtain those rights. While due process generally does not
require equal treatment for all persons,30 it does require any classifica-
tion that causes unequal treatment to have a rational basis reasonably
related to the legislative purpose of the challenged provision. 31 Although
the instant Court argued the appropriateness of congressional concern
for the dual nationality problem, it is submitted that this legitimate
concern, to which the residency requirement is addressed, cannot consti-
tute reasonable justification for the imposition of a classification that
will subject some United States citizens to involuntary expatriation.
Admittedly, the residency requirement serves an important and occa-
sionally necessary acculturative purpose, 32 but after completing the pre-
scribed period of American residence, the dual national is no less a dual
27. The Court avoided a consideration of the due process issue when it concluded that
Schneider, a decision relying almost exclusively on fifth amendment due process grounds, actually
was based on the fourteenth amendment citizenship clause.
28. See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958); Boudin, Involuntary Loss of American
Nationality, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1510, 1529 (1960).
29. Section one of the fourteenth ameildment protects all persons, including citizens and
aliens, against deprivations of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CoNsT.
amend. XIV, § 1.
30. See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (curfew imposed upon Japa-
nese Nisei in military area upheld as not violative of due process clause); West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (minimum wage legislation for women upheld as not violative of due
process clause).
31. See, e.g., Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (segregated schools held to be discrimi-
natorily violative of the due process clause); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937)
(classification supported by public policy and practical convenience held not violative of fifth
amendment).
32. The district court made the same concession as to the acculturative efficacy of the
residency requirement. 296 F. Supp. at 1252.
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national and must contend with the many difficulties associated with
that status.3 At best, the unilaterally imposed residency requirement is
a temporary, ineffective measure with which to deal with dual national-
ity.3
4
In distinguishing Afroyim and Schneider the Court embraced a
very narrow, plain-meaning construction of the fourteenth amendment
citizenship clause, the effect of which is to exclude foreign-born children
of American citizens from the protection of the clause and to subject
them to denationalization under section 301 (b). Four significant consid-
erations strongly militate against the adoption of this constitutional
construction. First, the citizenship clause, and indeed the entire first
section of the fourteenth amendment, was intended as a general declara-
tion of fundamental rights that does not lend itself to the strict word-
by-word interpretation imposed by the instant Court. The drafters were
seeking to define United States citizenship and the fundamental pri-
vileges and immunities associated therewith in broad language;- there
is no evidence of an intention to exclude any particular category of
American citizenship from the scope of the clause.36 Since the broad
terminology employed throughout the amendment is indicative of an
intention not to enumerate specific rights, the amendment, and the citi-
zenship clause in particular, should be interpreted with the knowledge
that each word cannot be assigned a precise constitutional significance
without emasculating the sweeping declaratory nature of the amend-
ment. Secondly, the narrow construction adopted by the instant Court,
in addition to exalting the plain meaning of the citizenship clause over
the spirit of the fourteenth amendment, raises a serious question of
33. Some of those difficulties could include: being called upon to fulfill obligations to 2 states
that are at war with each other; compulsory military service in 2 states during peacetime; and the
fact that states are likely to regard with disfavor those nationals who owe allegiance to foreign states
and who contribute substantially to the welfare and security of those foreign states. N. BAR-
YAACOV, DUAL NATIONALITY 4-6 (1961).
34. "[D]ual nationality will be with us as long as some states look chiefly to the place of
birth (us sol), and others to descent (jus sanguinis). Also, we shall have it as long as some states
do, and some do not, require their permission for their nationals to become naturalized elsewhere;
and as long as some states do, and some do not, permit automatic change of nationality by
marriage." F. Russell, Dual Nationality in Practice-Some Bizarre Results, 4 INT'L LAW. 756,
763 (1970). A broad solution to the dual nationality dilemma has been offered by Bar-Yaacov. He
suggests that children obtain the nationality of the country in which their parents have established
a permanent residence, presuming that the residence of the child follows the residence of the parents.
N. BAR-YAACOV, supra note 33, at 271.
35. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474-76 (1866); J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 78, 179 (1956).
36. The drafters spent a considerable portion of their time and energies attempting to formu-
late a definition that would include ex-slaves and some consideration was given to the effect of the
amendment upon the American Indians and the Chinese. J. JAMES, supra note 35, at 78.
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constitutional construction with respect to the privileges and immunities
clause. If foreign-born children of American citizens are excluded from
the scope of the citizenship clause, it should necessarily follow that they
are also excluded from protection under the privileges and immunities
clause37 since that clause relies upon the citizenship clause definition of
citizenship. This result surely was not intended by the drafters, who, by
including the privileges and immunities clause, were attempting to insu-
late the status of American citizenship from the effect of discriminatory
state legislation 38 rather than limit the rights of any ole category of
citizens. Although the scope and import of the privileges and immunities
clause have not yet been fully articulated, it is implausible that the
instant Court intended that foreign-born children of American citizens
not be included within its protection. Exclusion of these citizens would
jeopardize several of their fundamental rights that are assertedly based
upon the privileges and immunities clause, including: the right to travel
from state to state;39 the right to vote for national officers;40 and the right
to enter public lands.41 Thirdly, the instant Court's narrow construction
of the citizenship clause increases the probability that a foreign-born
child of an American citizen will be rendered stateless by the operation
of section 301 (b). Although the instant Court rationalized the impact of
its ruling on the plaintiff by assuming that his Italian citizenship would
adequately protect him, not every foreign-born child of an American
citizen possesses another nationality upon which to rely if deprived of
his United States citizenship. 2 Since the power to denationalize freely
in furtherance of limited political and diplomatic ends supports the con-
comitant power to create statelessness, 43 the operation of the condition
subsequent could prove instrumental in depriving a foreign-born child
of any nationality whatsoever. The plight of the stateless individual
certainly is not enviable, for he can be readily expelled from the country
37. The privileges and immunities clause provides that "no state shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
38. J. JAmEs, supra note 35, at 180.
39. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (Douglas, Black & Murphy, JJ., concurring).
40. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (the Court listed several rights arising from
the privileges and immunities clause, including the right to petition Congress, and the right to safety
while in the custody of a United States marshal).
41. Id.
42. The foreign-born children of American citizens who are born in nations applying the
principle of jus sanguinis, under which nationality and citizenship are acquired exclusively by
descent through one's parents, regardless of place of birth, acquire only the nationalities of their
parents.
43. Boudin, supra note 28, at 1529.
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of his original nationality as well as from any other nation." Fourthly,
in 1868 when the fourteenth amendment was first proposed, there were
comparatively few emigrants from the United States, and therefore, the
anticipated number of foreign-born children of American citizens was
insignificant.45 For this reason, a special provision in the citizenship
clause for foreign-born children was unnecessary. With over 40,000
Americans currently leaving the United States each year to reside
abroad permanently," however, there will be a substantial number of
foreign-born children placed in the instant plaintiff's predicament. A
broader construction of the citizenship clause therefore is necessary to
give effect to the inclusive spirit of the amendment and to alleviate a
problem that, although unforeseen by the drafters, will become more
pervasive as the current American exodus mounts.
Constitutional Law-Equal Protection -School
Financing System that Substantially Relies on Local
Property Tax Violates Equal Protection Clause
Appellants initiated a class action seeking to have the California
public school financing system' declared unconstitutional as a violation
of equal protection.2 Appellants alleged that the system, with its substan-
44, H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 377 (2d ed. 1966).
45. During the decade between 1860 and 1870, gross immigration to the United States
exceeded net immigration by approximately 230,000 migrants, indicating that 23,000 emigrated
from the United States each year. Most of these emigrants, who had been aliens in the United
States, returned to their native lands. They did not therefore pose the significant citizenship diffi-
culties encountered in the instant case. See J. SPENGLER & 0. DUNCAN, DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS
277-78 (1956).
46. TI E, Nov. 30, 1970, at 14.
I. Plaintiffs were Los Angeles County public school children and their parents. The children
brought suit on behalf of a class consisting of all public school pupils in California, "except children
in that school district, the identity of which is presently unknown, which school district affords the
greatest educational opportunity of all school districts within California." Serrano v. Priest, 487
P.2d 1241, 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 604 (1971). The parents brought suit on behalf of all parents
who have children in the school system and who pay real property taxes in the county of their
residence. The defendants were the Treasurer, the Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the
Controller of the State of California, as well as the Tax Collector, Treasurer, and Superintendent
of Schools of the County of Los Angeles. The county officials were sued both in their local
capacities and as representatives of a class composed of the school superintendent, tax collector,
and treasurer of each of the other counties in the state.
2. Appellants also sought an order directing appellees to reallocate school funds to remedy
the invalidity and for an adjudication that the trial court retain jurisdiction of the action so that it
might restructure the system if appellees and the legislature failed to act within a reasonable time.
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tial dependence on local property taxes3 and resultant wide disparities
in school revenue, invidiously discriminates against the poor and makes
the quality of a child's education a function of the wealth of his locality.,
Urging that the right to an education in California's public schools is a
fundamental interest that cannot be conditioned on wealth, appellants
maintained that there is no compelling state interest necessitating the
present method of financing. Appellees, while disputing that the financ-
ing scheme discriminates on the basis of wealth, 5 maintained first that
the variations in per pupil expenditure are reasonably related to the
legislative policy of delegating the right to determine tax rates to local
districts in order that the expenditure reflect the relative importance that
the district places on education; and second, that classification by wealth
is constitutional as long as the wealth is that of the district, not the
individual. Upon motion,' the trial court dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.7
On appeal to the Supreme Court of California, held, reversed and re-
manded.' A public school financing system with substantial dependence
Appellants alleged that the financing scheme involved violated both the fourteenth amendment of
the United States Constitution and article I, §§ II and 21, of the California constitution. Section
II provides: "All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation." Section 21 states: "No
special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted which may not be altered, revoked, or repealed
by the Legislature; nor shall any citizen, or class of citizens, be granted privileges or immunities
which, upon the same terms, shall not be granted to all citizens." The California courts have
construed those provisions as "substantially the equivalent" of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kircher, 62 Cal. 2d 586, 588, 400 P.2d
321, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329, 330 (1965).
3. The property valuations recently ranged from a low of S103 to a peak of $952,156 per
child. "Per child" determinations are based not on total enrollment, but on "average daily atten-
dance," a figure computed by adding together the number of students actually present on each
school day and dividing that total by the number of days actually taught. California educational
revenues for the fiscal year 1968-69 came from the following sources: local property taxes, 55.7%;
state aid, 35.5%; federal funds, 6.1%; and miscellaneous sources, 2.7%. 487 P.2d at 1247, 96 Cal.
Rptr. at 607 (1971).
4. Appellants also argued that the school financing system violates CAL. CoNsT. art. IX, § 5,
which states, in pertinent part: "The Legislature shall provide for a system of common schools by
which a free school shall be kept up and supported in each district at least six months every year
... "' (emphasis added). Appellants maintained that the present financing method produces
separate and distinct systems, each offering an educational program that varies with the relative
wealth of the district's residents. The court rejected this argument, and found that the provision in
§ 5 did not require uniform educational expenditures in order for there to be a "system of common
schools."
5. Since appellants alleged in their original complaint that a correlation existed between the
amoun of per pupil expenditure and the quality of education, the court took judicial notice of the
fact as admitted by the demurrer to the complaint.
6. Both State and local officials, demurring, moved to dismiss.
7. 10 Cal. App. 3d 1110, 89 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1970).
8. On October 21, 1971, the California Supreme Court issued a clarification of its earlier
ruling, pointing out that it had not yet actually struck down the school finance system, but had
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on local property taxes and resultant wide disparities in school revenue
violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
The traditional rule for whether a statutory classification violates
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment9 is that a pres-
umption of constitutionality 0 applies if the classification is rationally
related to a legitimate governmental objective." Because of this pres-
umption of constitutionality and because there existed only the minimal
requirement that legislative classifications be rational, 2 the Supreme
Court found that the traditional test did not adequately protect funda-
mental rights and consequently created a second test, the "compelling
interest" test. 3 This relatively recent test requires that the state establish
not only that it has a compelling interest which justifies the law, but also
that the distinctions drawn are necessary to fulfill the legislative pur-
pose.' By placing the burden on the state, and reversing the presump-
tion of constitutionality, the compelling interest test 5 greatly reduces the
merely ordered the case returned to the trial court to determine if the facts are as alleged. If they
are, the trial court must find the system unconstitutional. Wise, The California Doctrine,
SATURDAY REVIEW, Nov. 20, 1971, at 78, 82.
9. "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CoNsT: amend. XIV, § 1.
10. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (class legislation prohibited unless it
affects alike all persons similarly situated).
11. See, e.g., Rapid Transit Corp. v. City of New York, 303 U.S. 573, 578 (1938) (object of
raising revenue is rationally related to the imposition of a 3% tax on the gross incomes of public
utilities); Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155 (1897) (penalty imposed upon railroad
corporations for failing to pay debts struck down as an arbitrary and irrational classification).
12. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). In McGowan, the Court upheld
state legislation that prohibited merchants in all but one county of the state from the retail sale on
Sunday of such items as automobile and boating accessories, flowers, toilet goods, hospital supplies,
and souvenirs. The legislation also exempted individuals in one county from a statewide prohibition
against the operation of a bathing beach, bathhouse, dancing saloon, or amusement park on
Sunday.
13. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658 (1969) (compelling interest test used to
strike down welfare residency requirements in 3 states); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966) (compelling interest test used to strike down Virginia's poll tax); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (statute providing for punishment of interracial cohabitation declared
invalid as violation of equal protection).
14. See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965). Although the Court found Texas' interest
valid in excluding military personnel stationed in Texas from the franchise because a transient's
interest in local affairs is often insubstantial, the Court found the statute invalid because the state
could, with little difficulty, make a distinction between those who had a bona fide domicile and
those who did not. See also Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966) (Court invalidated classification
affecting criminal appellants because there were alternatives available to the State which made the
classification unnecessary).
15. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (Oklahoma
statute providing for compulsory sterilization of "habitual criminals" held subject to "strict scruti-
ny-' because it affected "one of the basic civil rights").
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likelihood that a statute will withstand constitutional challenge."6 The
compelling interest test has two branches: (1) the "suspect" criteria
branch and (2) the "fundamental interests" branch. Two criteria1 7 for
classifications that the Court has held to be suspect are race,8 and
wealth. 9 The fundamental interests concept has been defined to include
the following areas: (1) the right to vote; 20 (2) the procedural rights of
criminal defendants; 21 (3) the right to procreate; 22 (4) the right to free
interstate movement;2 and, possibly, (5) the right to an education. 2 A
1956 case, Griffin v. Illinois,25 indicated a tendency on the part of the
Court to require the state to show a compelling interest when a statutory
16. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. Rav. 1065 (1969).
17. See also Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (criterion of political allegiance argua-
bly added to suspect classifications).
18. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (statutory scheme to prevent marriages between
persons solely on the basis of racial classifications struck down); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184 (1964) (statute punishing interracial cohabitation struck down); see Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (racial classifications, especially suspect in criminal statutes,
subject to the "most rigid scrutiny"). See also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100
(1943) (distinction between citizens because of "ancestry" struck down); W. LOCKHART, Y. K&.ii-
SAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CASES-COMMENTS -QUESTIONS 1228 (1967).
19. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (striking down Virginia's poll
tax); see McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969) (dictum). See also
Michelman, On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, Forward to the Supreme
Court-1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 20 (1969).
20. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (striking down poll tax); see
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (statute excluding military personnel from the franchise
struck down); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (right to vote is impaired not only when a
qualified individual is barred from voting, but also when the impact of his ballot is diminished by
unequal apportionment).
21. In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956), for example, the petitioners had been
prevented from bringing writ of error after conviction because they could not afford a certified bill
of exception. The Court, in a 5-4 decision, asserted: "In criminal trials a State can no more
discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color." Id. at 17. See also
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (required appointment of counsel by the state for appeal
guaranteed by law).
22. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (Oklahoma
statute providing for compulsory sterilization of "habitual criminals" held subject to "strict scruti-
ny" because it affected "one of the basic civil rights").
23. The Supreme Court in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), held unconstitutional
statutory provisions that denied welfare assistance to persons who were residents and met all other
eligibility requirements except that they had not resided within the jurisdiction for at least a year
immediately preceding their applications for assistance.
24. See, e.g.. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (race determinative); Hobson v.
Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), affd sub nom.. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C.
Cir. 1969) (ability grouping in schools struck down). Even when the effect of classification has been
harmful to educational opportunities for blacks, most courts have hesitated to disturb school boards
acting without a racially discriminatory motive. See Downs v. Board of Educ., 336 F.2d 988 (10th
Cir. 1964); Bell v. School City, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963).
25. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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classification according to the wealth of an individual affects fundamen-
tal interests. In Griffin, the first in a line of criminal procedure cases,
the Court held that when a state statutorily guarantees writs of error as
of right 26 it cannot administer the statute so as to deny effective appel-
late review to the poor while granting review to all others.z2 In 1963, in
Douglas v. California28 the Court extended the wealth principle to re-
quire appointment of counsel by the state for indigents in the one appeal
guaranteed by California law.29 In 1966, in Harper v. Virginia Board of
Elections," poverty significantly reappeared outside the criminal area as
a special ground for the application of the compelling interest test.31 In
Harper, the Court held invalid a one dollar and fifty cent poll tax and
invoked the compelling interest test because of the combination of
wealth as a suspect classification and voting as a fundamental interest.32
Similarly, in Shapiro v. Thompson,3 when the Court invalidated the one
year welfare residency requirements of three states, the combination of
a wealth classification and the fundamental right to interstate movement
was dispositive. Because a wealth classification has never been found to
be sufficient in itself to necessitate the compelling interest test, the deter-
mination of whether an interest is "fundamental" is crucial to the avail-
ability of the compelling interest test.3 Although the Court historically
has referred to education as at least a fundamental value, 3 there is no
26. Id. at 18.
27. Id. at 13. See also Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (Griffin extended to invalidate
the imposition upon indigents of a $20 filing fee as a condition precedent to all criminal appeals to
the Ohio Supreme Court); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, 357 U.S.
214, 216 (1958) (made result in Griffin retroactive).
28. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
29. See In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 473 P.2d 999, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1970) (poor defendant
denied equal protection when imprisoned only because he could not pay a fine).
30. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
31. See Harvith, The Constitutionality of Residence Tests for General and Categorical As-
sistance Programs, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 567 (1966); cf Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
The Court in Boddie, using a due process rationale, held that it is unconstitutional to allow poverty
to effectively bar an individual seeking a divorce from access to civil courts.
32. See Coons, Clune, & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional
Test for State Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L. Rav. 305 (1969); Developments in the Law-Equal
Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1969); Note, Discriminations Against the Poor and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 81 HARV. L. REv. 435 (1967).
33. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
34. See Coons, Clune, & Sugarman, supra note 32, at 373.
35. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923) (state statute forbidding teaching of any modern language other than English to children
who had not successfully passed the eighth grade held a violation of due process); Interstate Ry. v.
Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, 87 (1907) (state statute that required street railway company to charge
one-half the regular fare for the transportation of pupils to and from the public schools upheld);
Coons, Clune, & Sugarman, supra note 32, at 375; Horowitz & Neitring, Equal Protection Aspects
of Inequalities in Public Education and Public Assistance Programs from Place to Place Within a
State, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 787,811 (1968).
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direct judicial authority for the proposition that education is a funda-
mental right." Reasoning from the Harper rationale, however, a strong
argument has been made that an individual who is denied his right to
vote is in no way damaged more severely than an individual who is
compelled to go to schools that are inadequate because of insufficient
financing.37 In 1969, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Hargrave v.
McKinney,38 acknowledged the validity of this position in a Florida
school funding case when it stated that education might well be consid-
ered a fundamental interest. In McInnis v. Shapiro 3 9 on the other hand,
the plaintiffs argued that the Illinois public school funding system4"
offended equal protection because a classification by educational needs
is the only one that is not arbitrary and irrational,4" but the three-judge
court upheld the wealth classification under the traditional rational rela-
tionship test. The Supreme Court affirmed in a brief per curiam opinion
that could easily be viewed as a refusal by the Court to hold formally
that education is a fundamental interest.
42
In the instant case, the court initially reviewed the California public
school financing system and concluded that the combination of a high
tax rate within a district 43 and state equalization aid4" does not, as a
practical matter, offset the "inequalities inherent in a financing system
36. See Hargrave v. McKinney, 413 F.2d 320, 324 (5th Cir. 1969), vacated, Askew v. Har-
grave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971).
37. See Coons, Clune, & Sugarman, supra note 32, at 366-69.
38. 413 F.2d 320, 324 (5th Cir. 1969). But see Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 40 U.S.L.W. 2228
(D. Minn., Oct. 12, 1971).
39. 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. 111. 1968) (3-judge court), affd mnem. sub nor., McInnis v.
Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
40. Coons, Clune, & Sugarman, supra note 32, at 312. The Illinois public school financing
system is similar to that of California.
41. See 293 F. Supp. at 329.
42. Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969) (per curiam); see Burrus v. Wilkerson, 397 U.S.
44, affg mem. 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969) (relied on Mclnnis in an attack on the constitu-
tionality of Virginia's financing scheme); Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944 (M.D. Fla. 1970)
(Mclnnis distinguished on the facts).
43. Although the California Legislature has placed ceilings on permissible district tax rates,
statutory maxima may be surpassed in a "tax override" election if a majority of the district's voters
approve a higher rate. Nearly all districts have voted to override the statutory limits. CAL. EDUC.
CODE §§ 20751, 20803 (West Supp. 1971).
44. The California State School Fund, pursuant to the "foundation program," undertakes
to supplement local taxes in order to provide a "minimum amount of guaranteed support to all
districts." Id. § 17300. The state contribution is distributed in 2 main forms. "Basic state aid"
consists of a flat grant to each district of $125 per pupil per year regardless of the wealth of the
district. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 6; CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 17751, 17801 (West 1969). "Equalization
aid" is distributed in inverse proportion to the wealth of the district, but only to an amount that
will ensure that each elementary school pupil receives $345 annually, and that each high school
student receives $488 annually. Id. §§ 17656, 17660, 17665.
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based on widely varying local tax bases."4 In rejecting appellee's under-
lying thesis that classification by wealth is constitutional as long as the
wealth is that of the district and not the individual, the court found that
the statutory classification was indeed one determined by wealth-a
suspect classification-and that discrimination on the basis of district
wealth is invalid. The court next considered the second element of appel-
lant's equal protection attack: that the right to equal educational oppor-
tunity in public schools is a fundamental interest. Without any direct
authority holding education is a fundamental interest, the instant court
first looked to decisions which had recognized the fundamental import-
ance of education in other contexts" and considered these for their per-
suasive effect. The court then reasoned that the right to an education is
at least as significant as an individual's right to vote and a criminal
defendant's right to certain procedural safeguards, both of which are
acknowledged fundamental interests. The court concluded that the im-
pact which compulsory education exerts on personality development and
on free enterprise democracy compels the treatment of education as a
fundamental interest.47 Having found both a suspect classification and
a fundamental interest, the court, using the compelling interest test, held
that a state-engineered public school financing system, with a substantial
reliance on local property taxes and resultant wide disparities in school
revenue, invidiously discriminates on the basis of wealth and adversely
affects the fundamental right to equal educational opportunity."
Although the instant decision follows as closely as possible the
rationale of Harper and Shapiro, it represents a distinct departure from
the questionable precedent of Mclnnis. While the instant court used the
compelling interest test, Mclnnis used the traditional rational relation-
ship test and found no invidious discrimination in a similar school fund-
45. 487 P.2d at 1247, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 607 (1971). Statistics show the following range of per
pupil expenditures for the 1969-70 school year:
Elementary High School Unified
Low S 407 S 722 S 612
Median 672 898 766
High 2,586 1,767 2,414
Id. Similar spending variations have been noted throughout the country, particularly when subur-
ban communities and urban ghettoes are compared. See, e.g., Levi, The University, The Profes-
sions, and The Law, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 251, 258-59 (1968).
46. Materials cited note 24 supra.
47. 487 P.2d at 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618 (1971).
48. See Coons, Clune, & Sugarman, supra note 32, at 319 (discussion of alternative methods
of public school funding).
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ing scheme. In asserting the applicability of the compelling interest test,
the California Supreme Court found the appellants' contentions in the
instant case significantly different from the appellants' position in
Mclnnis, in which it was argued that "educational needs" is the only
appropriate standard by which to measure educational funding against
the equal protection clause. Furthermore, unlike the Mclnnis court, the
instant court carefully analyzed the funding scheme and found that as a
practical matter, local property tax bases often vary so greatly from one
district to another that the disparities in school revenue cannot be elimi-
nated by either a poorer district's imposition of a higher tax rate, or by
state equalization aid. 9 One aspect of the appellants' proof remains to
be presented on remand: appellants must prove at trial0 that the quality
of education is in fact affected by the amount of per pupil expenditure,
since the court accepted their allegation to that effect only for purposes
of appellee's general demurrer. Because there is substantial authority
supporting the premise, appellants should have little difficulty in doing
So. 51 Beyond the proof determination, one additional question must be
resolved in order to view correctly the significance of the court's holding:
whether the court in fact held that the educational system violated the
California constitution as well as the Federal Constitution.12 If in fact
the court found that the California constitution was violated, as appel-
lants clearly alleged, then even an adverse appeal to the United States
Supreme Court cannot reverse the consequences of the decision on the
California educational system. 53 If, on the other hand, the court decided
the case on federal equal protection grounds alone, then it is likely that
the Supreme Court will be compelled to review the decision for the
simple reason that the California public school funding system resembles
the educational funding system of every state except Hawaii. 54 Thus the
instant decision could result in a complete restructuring of public school
49. "'In some cases districts with low expenditure levels have correspondingly low tax rates.
In many more cases, however, quite the opposite is true; districts with unusually low expenditures
have unusually high tax rates owing to their limited tax base.'" 487 P.2d at 1252, 96 Cal. Rptr.
at 612 (1971).
50. Materials cited note 8 supra.
51. See Melnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 331 (N.D. II1. 1968); Hobson v. Hansen, 269
F. Supp. 401,438 (D.D.C. 1967).
52. See note 2 supra.
53. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 428-30 (1963) (Court declined review of state court
judgment resting on independent and adequate state grounds, notwithstanding presence of federal
grounds); Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940) (Court could not clearly separate
the state and federal questions and therefore vacated the judgment and remanded the cause for-
further proceedings). See also Supreme Court Treatment of State Court Cases Exhibiting A mbigu-
ous Grounds of Decision, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 822 (1962).
54. Coons, Clune, & Sugarman, supra note 32, at 312.
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funding throughout the nation. 5 Of further significance is the fact that
the court, in finding that such a system would be invalid and in conclud-
ing that education is a fundamental interest, extended the compelling
interest test for the first tiime to the delivery of a governmental service."
The instant court, in finding education a fundamental interest,5 7 took
into account the unique influence that a compulsory school system exer-
cises on the molding of a citizen's personality. In so doing, the court
reasoned that other public services, such as police, fire, and health, are
not equally fundamental. The court, however, did not have the issue of
the constitutionality of these other public service financing systems di-
rectly before it and, consequently, the instant decision could pave the
way for other challenges to a broad range of governmental services.5"
This would require the Supreme Court to articulate further the factors
warranting the use of the compelling interest test in equal protection
challenges.
Constitutional Law-Freedom of Speech-A Per Se Ban
on All Editorial Advertisements by a Broadcast Licensee
Violates the First Amendment
Petitioner, an organization opposed to the Vietnam war, filed a
complaint with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) after
a radio station refused to sell petitioner broadcast time for announce-
ments urging immediate withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam.,
The station based the refusal on its established policy of broadcasting
only noncontroversial advertisements and banning all paid advertise-
ments on controversial public issues. Petitioner alleged that this policy
55. Since the instant decision, a federal district court has ruled that Minnesota's public
school financing system, essentially the same as California's, violates the fourteenth amendment
equal protection guarantee. Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 40 U.S.L.W. 2228 (D. Minn. Oct. 12, 1971).
56. See Kelly v. Tate County School Dist., Civil No. 30,722 (D. Miss., Sept. 17, 1971) (set
aside sale of public school property to all-white public school); cf Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437
F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971) (disparities in municipal sewer services between white and black neigh-
borhoods found to deny equal protection).
57. 487 P.2d at 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618 (1971).
58. Note, California Educational Financing System Violates Equal Protection, 5
CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW 287, 299 (1971).
I. WTOP, an all-news radio station in Washington, D.C., had refused to broadcast any of
several one minute announcements prepared by petitioner.
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violated its first amendment right of free speech, 2 but the FCC denied
relief, holding that the exclusion of all editorial advertisements was a
permissible exercise of the broadcaster's discretion.' On petition to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, held,
reversed and remanded. When a broadcast licensee accepts noncon-
troversial paid announcements, its absolute refusal to sell any advertis-
ing time to applicants seeking to present controversial public issues is
violative of the first amendment. Business Executives' Move for Viet-
nam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
In 1934, Congress created the FCC 4 and broadly delegated to that
authority the duty of insuring that broadcast licensees act in the public
interest.' Along with this mandate, however, Congress also specifically
cautioned the Commission against abridging first amendment rights in
its regulation of radio communication.6 In order to give meaning to these
charges, the Commission looked to the Government's relationship with
newspaper publishers. There, in the context of freedom of the press, the
first amendment had long been interpreted to protect the publisher from
government censorship. 7 The Commission initially applied this principle
2. Petitioner also alleged that the station's policy violated the fairness doctrine of the FCC.
The doctrine "requires that licensees devote a reasonable percentage of their broadcasting time to
the discussion of public issues of interest in the community served by their stations and that such
programs be designed so that the public has a reasonable opportunity to hear different opposing
positions on the public issues of interest and importance in the community." Editorializing by
Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1257-58 (1949).
3. Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C.2d 242 (1970). The Commission
dismissed petitioner's first amendment argument, holding that the fairness doctrine affords all the
protection the first amendment demands.
4. Comprehensive federal regulation of broadcasting began with the enactment of the Radio
Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162. The Radio Act established the Federal Radio Commission
(FRC), the FCC's predecessor, and charged it with administering broadcast regulations. The FCC
was established by the Communications Act of 1934,47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1964), which presently
contains the statutory authorizations pertinent to the control of broadcasting.
5. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1964) provides that the Commission has an obligation to ensure that
broadcast licensees serve the "public convenience, interest or necessity." While this provision has
been the basis for the Commission's regulation of program content, its vagueness has led to much
controversy between the Commission and the industry. The standard of "public convenience,
interest or necessity" has been held not to be sufficiently vague to prevent fair enforcement, NBC
v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943), and to be as concrete as the complicated factors inherent in
a decision concerning the communications industry allow. FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc.,
346 U.S. 86, 90 (1953). In its Program Policy Statement of July 29, 1960, the Commission
announced that to meet this standard in the area of program content, the broadcaster must "make
a positive, diligent and continuous effort, in good faith, to determine the tastes, needs and desires
of the public in his community and to provide programming to meet those needs and interests."
Henry v. FCC, 302 F.2d 191, 192-93 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
6. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1964) provides that "no regulation . . . shall be promulgated . . .
which shall interfere with the rights of free speech by means of radio communication."
7. Except under certain unusual circumstances, freedom of the press has been interpreted to
mean immunity from prior restraints or censorship by a governmental agency. After publication,
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to the broadcast industry and interpreted its mandate against abridging
first amendment rights as a prohibition against censoring the broad-
caster.' Since active advocacy of the public interest might infringe upon
a broadcaster's freedom of speech, the FCC seemed reluctant, at first,
to use the public interest standard as a basis of program regulation
Consequently, nearly a decade passed before the Supreme Court, in
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,0 first established the
permissible scope of FCC activity within first amendment confines. In
that case, the Court upheld an FCC regulation under which a broad-
caster's license had been revoked for practices deemed by the Com-
mission to be inimical to the public interest." Concluding that the
broadcaster's right of free speech had not been violated, the Court
reasoned that because of the limited number of broadcast frequencies,
radio was not widely available as a forum and should be subject to more
pervasive federal regulation than other media. 2 Upon this constitutional
both public and private redress are available through libel laws and criminal sanctions. See, e.g.,
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 715-16 (1931).
8. The Commission acknowledged a conflict between this interpretation and its public inter-
est mandate in Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). Concerning licensees'
obligations to operate their stations in the public interest the Commission stated: "[W]e believe
that the paramount and controlling consideration is the relationship between the American system
of broadcasting carried on through a large number of private licensees upon whom devolves the
responsibility for the selection and presentation of program material, and the congressional man-
date that this licensee responsibility is to be exercised in the interests of. . .the public. ... 13
F.C.C. at 1247. The FRC, moreover, had been created as a result of judicial rulings that the
Department of Commerce had no statutory authority to allocate radio frequencies. Because the
problem was technical in nature, it was argued that the FRC, and later the FCC, could not go
beyond the technical aspect of broadcast regulation. Note, Regulation of Program Content by the
F.C.C., 77 HARV. L. REV. 701 (1964). Accordingly, the Commission was required to devote a
majority of its time to developing a technical regulatory scheme that would bring broadcasting out
of the chaos in which it had floundered before governmental regulation began. As a result, little
time was spent investigating the quality or content of what was broadcast. See Sentinel Broadcast-
ing Corp., 8 F.C.C. 140 (1940) (public interest, convenience or necessity contemplates the most
widespread and effective technical service possible); Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment:
Observations on 40 Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REV. 67, 69-70 (1967).
9. Early FRC and FCC decisions in the area of program content were made in cases involving
applications for license renewals. The actions that caused the Commission to deny a license renewal
indicate the extent of provocation necessary before the Commission felt it could safely act. See
Trinity Methodist Church v. FRC, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1932)
(licensee used broadcast time to attack Catholics and Jews and was found in contempt in state court
for statements tending to obstruct the judicial process); KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. FRC, 47 F.2d
670 (D.C. Cir. 1931) (3 one-half hour segments daily devoted to prescribing broadcaster's medical
preparations for patients who were never seen, but who described their illness in letters).
10. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
I1. The suit involved the Commission's chain broadcasting regulations that dealt with net-
work control and use of local station broadcasting time. 319 U.S. at 194.
12. Justice Frankfurter stated: "Unlike other modes of expression, radio inherently is not
available to all. That is its unique characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of expression,
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underpinning, and in furtherance of its public interest mandate, the
Commission constructed the fairness doctrine.13 By requiring that broad-
casters seek out all sides of a controversial public issue and present
opposing viewpoints in a fair manner," the doctrine made the public
interest an active concept by placing an affirmative duty upon the broad-
casting industry to act in accordance therewith. 15 Further realizing that
effective regulation would be impossible if the public interest were stifled
by broadcasters' first amendment rights, the Commission promulgated
standards requiring broadcasters to offer free reply time to any indi-
vidual or group personally attacked on the broadcasters' station.,6 The
Supreme Court upheld this requirement in Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC. 17 In that case, the broadcaster argued that the scarcity rationale
enunciated in National Broadcasting was no longer a legitimate basis for
FCC regulation,18 and that without this constitutional backing, the reply
it is subject to governmental regulation." 319 U.S. at 226. Almost every decision that has dealt
with the Commission's power to regulate in nontechnical areas has quoted some portion of Justice
Frankfurter's opinion. Robinson, supra note 8, at 86.
13. The first formal statement of the fairness doctrine was issued in Editorializing by Broad-
cast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). See note 2 supra. For ajudicial discussion of the development
of the doctrine see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-81 (1969).
14. See Robert Harold Scott, II F.C.C. 372 (1946); Note, The Federal Communications
Commission's Fairness Regulations: A First Step Towards Creation of a Right of Access to the
Mass Media, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 294 (1969).
15. 13 F.C.C. at 1251. The Commission made it clear, however, that an individual's interest
in self-expression is subordinate to the public interest in reaching the truth. "It is this right of the
public to be informed, rather than any right on the part of the Government, any broadcast licensee
or any individual member of the public to broadcast his own particular views on any matter, which
is the foundation stone of the American system of broadcasting." Id. at 1249.
16. The Commission, however, never made effective use of the fairness doctrine. No licensee
was ever disciplined for failure to perform his duties under the doctrine, and denials of license
renewals were rare. Singer, The FCC and Equal Time: Never-Neverland Revisited, 27 MD. L. REV.
221, 248 (1967). The lack of effective enforcement resulted in an attitude in the industry that
prompted Chief Justice, then Judge, Burger to remark as recently as 1966: "After nearly five
decades of operation the broadcast industry does not seem to have grasped the simple fact that a
broadcast license is a public trust subject to termination for breach of duty." Office of Communica-
tion of The United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
17. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). Red Lion Broadcasting Co. was licensed to operate a Pennsylvania
radio station, WGCB. WGCB carried a 15-minute broadcast by the Reverend Billy James Hargis
in which Hargis discussed a book entitled Goldwater-Extremist on the Right by Fred Cook.
Hargis alleged that Cook had been fired by a newspaper for making false charges against city
officials, worked for a Communist-affiliated publication, had defended Alger Hiss, and attacked
J. Edgar Hoover. Cook demanded reply time and the station refused. Id. at 371-72.
18. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. is not alone in this view. Several writers have pointed out
that there are now more radio and television stations than daily newspapers, and that this disparity
is increasing. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 8, at 156-59. The Seventh Circuit has noted that the
mushrooming number of FM and UHF frequencies has made a channel available to anyone able
to afford the equipment. Radio Television News Directors Ass'n v. United States, 400 F.2d 1002,
1019 (7th Cir. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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time order infringed upon its first amendment rights. The Court, how-
ever, not only affirmed the scarcity rationale, but also recognized a
passive constitutional right in the public, 9 consistent with the first
amendment's purpose of preserving an uninhibited market place of
ideas,20 to receive information from the broadcast media. Comparing the
broadcast licensee to a fiduciary, the Court entrusted the licensee with
the active duty of preserving the public's first amendment rights in
broadcasting.2' At the time of this decision, it had repeatedly been held
in the context of publicly owned non-broadcasting forums, that the
denial of access to paid advertisements solely because of their controver-
sial nature was violative of the first amendment. 22 Red Lion, however,
stopped short of extending similar access to the broadcast media.23
In the instant case the court initially observed that until recently
only broadcasters had been found to have first amendment interests in
the operation of the radio and television industries. 24 The court found
that one reason for this attitude was a judicial view of state action that
imposed first amendment limitations solely upon the actions of the fed-
19. See note 15 supra.
20. 395 U.S. at 390.
21. While finding the broadcaster to be a fiduciary for the public, the Court saw the Govern-
ment, not the public, as the proper body to enforce that relationship. 395 U.S. at 398. Freedom of
expression was not extended to mean freedom of self-expression in the public. "The Red Lion case
f . . inds the law of freedom of expression in mid-passage. Old and new theories of broadcast
regulation walk into each other in the case." Barron, Access-The Only Choice for the Media, 48
TEXAS L. REV. 766,771 (1970).
22. See, e.g., Lee v. Board of Regents of State Colleges, 306 F. Supp. 1097 (W.D. Wis. 1969)
(advertisements in school newspaper); Kissinger v. New York City Transit Authority, 274 F. Supp.
438 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (advertisements on subway station walls); Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa
Transit Dist., 68 Cal. 2d 51, 434 P.2d 982, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967) (advertisements on city transit
buses). Streets, parks, and other public places traditionally have been recognized as proper forums
for discussion of public issues. The Supreme Court has allowed regulation of these facilities only
to the extent necessary to serve the public convenience or to protect the peace. See Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536 (1965) (a restriction on free speech, designed to promote the public convenience, is
constitutional if not susceptible to discriminatory application); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S.
569 (1941) (state law requiring a parade permit in order to ensure public safety and convenience in
use of public streets a constitutional regulation). See also Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52
(1942) (protection of free speech on public issues does not extend to speech that is nothing more
than commercial advertising).
23. The FCC has recognized a right of access, however, for so-called equal time purposes
and for responding to certain personal attacks. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1964), for example, provides,
with some exceptions, that if a licensee allows a political candidate to use his broadcasting station,
he must afford equal opportunities to all other candidates for that office. See also text accompany-
ing note 16 supra; Note, Fairness Doctrine: Television as a Marketplace of Ideas, 45 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 1222, 1237 (1970).
24. The court did not consider petitioner's fairness doctrine argument. The court found that
as the policy considerations surrounding both the fairness doctrine and the first amendment were
the same, it would consider only the first amendment argument, which it found to be the essence
of the case. Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 649 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
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eral government.as Reasoning that the reach of the first amendment
should be determined on functional considerations and not on public-
private technicalities which protect private conduct from legal limita-
tions put on state action despite the essentially public nature of the
enterprise 28 the court examined the general relationship of interdepend-
ence between broadcasting and government.21 From this analysis, the
court concluded that a broadcast licensee not only has constitutional
rights as a speaker, but also must abide by constitutional restrictions as
an administrator of a forum for free speech. In this dual role, the court
held that the broadcaster's constitutional interests in free speech coexist
with those of the public. Moreover, the court found that the public has
a first amendment interest not only in the content and mode of what it
receives,"8 but also in effective self-expression. Thus, the court felt that
the goal of a fully informed public could not be realized unless the public
was given an opportunity for this individual self-expression. 29 If a vigo-
rous and wide-open debate on important issues is desired 3 therefore, the
25. See Massachusetts Universalist Convention v. Hildreth & Rogers Co., 183 F.2d 497 (Ist
Cir. 1950) (first amendment limits only the action of Congress or of agencies of the federal
government, not private corporations); Mclntire v. William Penn Broadcasting Co., 151 F.2d 597
(3d Cir. 1945) (a privately owned radio station, though licensed by the federal government, cannot
be considered a governmental agency); Post v. Payton, 323 F. Supp. 799 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (to
recover under first or fourteenth amendment, it must be shown that defendant's conduct was
equivalent to state or federal action).
26. See Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968) (the
fact of private ownership is not, in itself, a bar to the exercise of first amendment rights); Public
Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) (federal regulations establish the interdependence
between government and private business necessary to allow the application of the first amend-
ment).
27. The court cited Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), for the proposition that specific
governmental approval of challenged private actions is sufficient state involvement to constitute
state action. The broadcast licensee operates under a 3 year license from the Government. It has
been argued that as the broadcaster's very existence is a result of the exercise of a governmental
power, any restraint or inhibition put on the expression of ideas by the broadcaster is therefore
authorized by the Government. Barron, In Defense of "Fairness": A First Amendment Rationale
for Broadcasting's "Fairness" Doctrine, 37 U. COLO. L. REv. 31, 44 (1964).
28. The court noted that unlike Red Lion, in which the public's first amendment interests
were invoked to uphold an administrative action already taken, the instant case involved an effort
by the public itself to assert its first amendment rights in a direct attack on broadcast policies
approved by the FCC. The court concluded that a constitutional right is meaningless if its applica-
tion is limited to permitting governmental action. 450 F.2d at 650; see note 15 supra.
29. The instant court noted that the first amendment is intended to secure "the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources." Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). The court found that editorial advertisements were particu-
larly suited for this purpose because the initial decision to produce the editorial is in the public and
the advertisement would be presented in a fashion chosen by the advertiser, free from the control
and editing of the broadcaster, 450 F.2d at 656.
30. The instant court specifically rejected the contention that newscasts, documentaries, and
panel discussions satisfy the first amendment goal, enunciated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964), of "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate on public issues.
court reasoned that the public would have to maintain the initiative in
and control over the presentation of any particular viewpoint. Recogniz-
ing, however, that broadcast time is limited, 3' the court held that while
the public has no unabridgeable first amendment right to use broadcast
frequencies comparable to its right to speak or write, the time available
does allow for a limited right to speak on the air. The court remanded
for the FCC to develop reasonable regulatory guidelines32 to deal with
editorial advertisements.
The instant court faced a dilemma that could no longer be ignored.
On one hand, in the face of an ever increasing number of radio and
television stations and an ever diminishing number of daily newspa-
pers,33 the limited access rationale of National Broadcasting had no
continuing viability as a basis for regulating the broadcasting industry.
On the other hand, however, the court was unwilling to abdicate govern-
ment control of broadcasting by accepting the industry's argument that
freedom of speech protected only the freedom of the broadcaster. Al-
though freedom of expression traditionally has implied absence of
government control, the conditions under which freedom of expression
exists today require that Government assume the burden of assuring a
medium receptive to the communication of ideas.3 For example, the very
increase in the number of radio and television frequencies that made the
limited access rationale untenable has since resulted in bland commer-
cialism in today's programming.3 5 Broadcasters have come to look to
the first amendment as a guarantee of economic rather than civil rights,
and have avoided controversy rather than offend sponsors who are hesi-
tant to become associated with opinions that potential customers might
find disagreeable.3 6 Had the instant court permitted private control of
31. In speaking of limited broadcast time the court was not referring to the scarcity rationale,
which is not based on broadcast time, but on the limited number of available frequencies.
32. The court, however, gave the Commission some direction in its task, noting that access
may not be denied unless a particular type of expression presents a clear and present danger. 450
F.2d at 662. The Commission had expressed concern that the fairness doctrine would require the
broadcaster, once he had accepted advertisements on one side of an issue, to accept some advertise-
ments on the other side, free of charge if necessary. While holding that some free advertising time
might be called for, the court expressed confidence in the Commission's ability to make adjustments
in its regulations if broadcasters were threatened with actual financial harm.
33. See note 18supra.
34. See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 902
(1963).
35. For an argument that much of the lack of diversity in broadcasting is due to the FCC's
standards, not those of the broadcaster, see Robinson, supra note 8, at 121.
36. Note, The Federal Communications Commission's Fairness Regulations: A First Step
Towards Creation of a Right of Access to the Mass Media, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 294, 296-97
(1969); see Johnson, Freedom to Create: The Implications of Anti-Trust Policy for Television
Programming Content, 8 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 11 (1970).
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the broadcasting industry, in which the means of access to airways
already are privately owned, the limited communication of controversial
ideas and viewpoints would certainly have been further frustrated. In-
stead, for the first time, the court recognized a constitutional right of
access to the mass media, and placed the burden of controlling that
access on the FCC. The instant court has given minority and disfran-
chised groups access to mass audiences through the most effective means
of modern communication .3 The decision is particularly important in
that it makes access for one point of view possible without requiring that
the other side of an issue first be broadcast.3 8 It is extremely difficult,
however, to give the decision any immediate significance beyond the
narrow holding the court was intent on providing. The court's reasoning
has narrowly defined the right of access within general broadcasting as
having its sole application to broadcasting time normally reserved for
commercial purposes. The court implicitly restricted its holding to the
broadcast media when it overcame the public-private technicality on the
basis of the Government's involvement in and the public character of
broadcasting. While newspapers and magazines would find it difficult
if not impossible to exist without such things as governmental mailing
privileges, it is unlikely that this will be regarded as sufficient govern-
mental involvement to bring these publications within the rationale of
the instant case.39 Having thus limited its holding to the broadcast
media, the court further narrowed its scope by acknowledging that when
noncommercial time is involved, disputes must be decided by balancing
the competing constitutional interests of the broadcaster against those
of the public. The court recognized that broadcasters' constitutional
interests in nonadvertising time are so great that their control of this
aspect of programming would not be affected.4" The effect of the instant
decision will depend upon the spirit with which it is received, both by
the Commission and the industry. But the recognition of a constitutional
right of access, even in the narrow context in which it has been recog-
nized, may well signal the beginning of an assault on privately owned
37. See Berelson, Communications and Public Opinion, in MASS COwNINUNICATIONs 527 (W.
Schramm ed. 1960).
38. See Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (fairness doctrine does not require that
broadcast stations donate air time for opponents of the draft to respond to armed services enlist-
ment advertisements); note 23 supra.
39. For a publisher's appraisal of freedom of access see Daniel, Right of Access to Mass
Media-Government Obligation to Enforce First Amendment?, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 783 (1970).
40. The instant court saw nonadvertising time as a forum that has not yet been opened to
the public by broadcast licensees. Only when a forum has been opened to the public, as licensees
have done with advertising time, is discriminatory denial of access a constitutional violation.
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forums. An effective forum has been recognized as a necessary prerequis-
ite to effective speech." Since a small number of people are in a position
to determine not only the content of information, but its availability, it
might be anticipated that private ownership of such forums, including
newspapers, may soon come under increasing constitutional attack.
Constitutional Law-Jury Trials in Juvenile
Court-Juveniles in Delinquency Proceedings Not
Constitutionally Guaranteed the Right to a Jury Trial
Appellant, a minor of sixteen, was adjudged a "delinquent child"'
by the juvenile court of Philadelphia 2 on charges of robbery, larceny, and
receiving stolen property. Although subject to possible incarceration
until his majority,3 the youth's request for a trial by jury was refused by
the juvenile court judge.' Appellant argued that the adjudicative delin-
quency proceeding, 5 regardless of what it might be called, is actually a
criminal trial and that denial of a jury trial violated his constitutional
rights as guaranteed by the sixth amendment' and the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. The Commonwealth contended that the
right to trial by jury did not extend to juvenile courts because of the
inherent functional differences between the criminal and juvenile sys-
41. See Wolin v. Port of N.Y. Authority, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968); note 22 supra and
accompanying text.
I. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. I1, §§ 243(2), (4) (1965) states that a "delinquent child" is one under
the age of 18 "who has violated any law of the Commonwealth or ordinance of any city, borough
or township."
2. The official designation of this court is Court of Common Pleas, Family Division, Juvenile
Branch, Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania. 215 Pa. Super. 760, 255 A.2d 921 (1969). The facts
surrounding the crime were clouded with conflicting testimony, but involved the stealing of 25 cents.
The event took place in October 1967, and McKeiver was placed on probation following the May
1968 hearing.
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. II, § 243 (1965) (majority is reached at age 18).
4. "ITihe court shall hear and determine all cases affecting children arising under the provi-
sions of this act without a jury." Id. § 247.
5. The delinquency proceeding is divided into 3 phases: (1) the pre-hearing phase to set the
stage for adjudication; (2) the adjudicative phase in which the youth is adjudged "delinquent" or
not; (3) the dispositional phase in which it is decided what is the best rehabilitation course for the
juvenile. See generally Glen, Bifurcated Hearings in the Juvenile Court, 16 CRIME & DELIN. 255
(1970); 9 DUQUESNE L. REV. 681, 687 (1971) (comment on recent decision, In re D., and part of
an untitled symposium on the juvenile court system).
6. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury. ... U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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tems. 7 While recognizing the applicability of certain procedural due
process safeguards to juveniles,' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court af-
firmed the juvenile court's denial of a trial by jury.' On appeal to the
United States Supreme Court, 10 held, affirmed. A trial by jury is not
constitutionally required in the adjudicative phase of a state juvenile
court delinquency proceeding. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528
(1971).
Delinquency" proceedings are a quasi-civil' 2 form of adjudication
that originated around the turn of the century 3 as an alternative to the
punitive and stigmatizing criminal trial. 4 Prior to the advent of the
juvenile court system, children could be considered adults for criminal
prosecutions as early as age seven.' 5 Eventually, every state modified this
common-law rule and adopted a juvenile court act 6 that increased the
7. The Superior Court adopted the Commonwealth's position. McKeiver Appeal, 216 Pa.
Super. 760, 255 A.2d 921 (1969).
8. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court required 7 procedural safeguards in the adjudicatory
hearing: (I) timely notice of the charges; (2) benefit of counsel; (3) confrontation of witnesses
against the accused; (4) protection against self incrimination; (5) provision of a transcript of the
hearing; (6) appellate review; and (7) proof of all allegations beyond a reasonable doubt. See note
31 infra and accompanying text.
9. In re Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 265 A.2d 350 (1970). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court consoli-
dated the McKeiver Appeal with Terry. Both involved similar delinquency proceedings that turned
on the right of juveniles to receive a jury trial. Under similar circumstances a North Carolina
juvenile court denied a jury trial to a group of children and also excluded the general public from
the proceeding. In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969).
10. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the North Carolina proceeding
and consolidated it with the Pennsylvania appeals to resolve the issue of jury trials in juvenile
delinquency proceedings.
11. The definitional term of "delinquency" varies from state to state. In Iowa, for example,
a juvenile who attempted rape was not delinquent because one must habitually violate the law to
be classified delinquent. State v. Breon, 244 Iowa 49, 55 N.W.2d 565 (1952). In New York, on the
other hand, a youth convicted of driving without a license was adjudged delinquent for violating a
state law. In re Jacobson, 283 App. Div. 719, 127 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1954). To circumvent invidious
connotations that have developed in connection with the term "delinquency," the descriptive phrase
"persons in need of supervision" (PINS) has arisen. See N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 712 (McKinney
1963); Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 HARV.
L. REv. 775 (1966).
12. Juvenile proceedings are considered more civil than criminal. See In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1, 17 (1966); Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556 (1st Cir. 1959) (authority in 51 jurisdictions
recognizes civil nature of juvenile procedures). But see Carr, Juries for Juveniles: Solving the
Dilemma, 2 LOYOLA U.L.J. 1 (1971) (in reality the juvenile system is sui generis--of its own kind).
13. The first juvenile court was established by Illinois in 1899. LAWS OF ILL., Juvenile Courts
(1899). See generally Nicholas, History, Philosophy and Procedures of Juvenile Courts, I J.
FA,ILY L. 151 (1961).
14. See Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 119-20 (1909).
15. At common law, a child over the age of 7 could be tried in a criminal case, convicted
and punished as an adult. Prior to age 7 there was an irrebuttable presumption of criminal incapa-
city. The presumption was rebuttable between 7 and 14. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 839 (1957).
16. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 211 Pa. Super. 62, 69, 234 A.2d 9, 13 (1967) (discussion
of juvenile court act adoption in all states).
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age of criminal responsibility and placed the juvenile under the parens
patriae7 power of the state for ultimate care and regenerative treatment.
Under the theory of the juvenile court system, the child was to receive
individualized justice 8 through an informal, flexible hearing that was not
designed to determine guilt or innocence but to decide the optimum
course for rehabilitation.' 9 Since the child was not entitled to freedom,
but only entitled to custodial care by either his parents or the state,20 the
juvenile court judge was allowed maximum discretion in the disposition
of an adjudged delinquent .2 Although the system was designed to pro-
tect the juvenile from the harsh criminal trial, he is often subjected to
confinement22 for longer periods than an adult who is guilty of similar
criminal offenses.2 Realizing this gap between the theoretical system 2
and actual practice,? the Supreme Court recently has attempted to bring
17. "Parens Patriae" refers to the powers of a state to assume the role of a parent. Compare
Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121 A. 678 (1923) (classicparenspatriae case), with Harris v. Souder,
233 Ind. 287, 119 N.E.2d 8 (1954) (points out the hard realities oftheparenspatriae power).
18. See generally Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV.
1187 (1970).
19. See J. MACK, THE CHILD, THE CLINIC AND THE COURTS 310 (1925).
20. Shears, Legal Problems Peculiar to Children's Courts, 48 A.B.A.J. 719,720 (1962), cited
in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967).
21. Cf. Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See also MACK, supra note 19.
22. Confinement of an adjudged "delinquent" varies from state to state with varying degrees
of rehabilitation. See In re Bethea, 215 Pa. Super. 75, 76, 257 A.2d 368, 369 (1969). Many
delinquents are not confined in special facilities as envisioned by the system. In 1965 over 100,000
juveniles were confined in adult prisons. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 179 (1967).
23. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. I, 29 (1967). Gault, 15, was accused of making lewd
telephone calls. He was committed to juvenile industrial school until he reached the age of 21, unless
discharged prior to that time. Had he been an adult, the maximum penalty would have been a $50
fine or imprisonment for 2 months. See generally Fortas, Equal Rights-For Whom?, 42 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 401 (1967).
24. "In theory the juvenile court was to be helpful and rehabilitative rather than punitive.
In fact, the distinction often disappears, not only because of the absence of facilities and personnel
but also because of the limits of knowledge and technique. In theory the court's action was to affix
no stigmatizing label. In fact a delinquent is generally viewed by employers, schools, the armed
services by society generally-as a criminal. In theory the court was to treat children guilty of
criminal acts in non-criminal ways. In fact it labels truants and runaways as junior criminals ....
"in theory it was to exercise its protective powers to bring an errant child back into the fold.
In fact there is increasing reason to believe that intervention reinforces the juvenile's unlawful
impulses." THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 9 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as TASK FORCE REPORT]. Although this report was written prior to Gault, it is an unusually
thorough and comprehensive work.
25. "Many things happened that prevented this dream from becoming a widespread reality.
First, municipal budgets were not equal to the task of enticing experts to enter this field in large
numbers. Second, such experts as we had, notably the psychiatrists and analysts, were drawn away
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the juvenile and criminal systems closer together by requiring certain
constitutional safeguards in delinquency proceedings. 2 In Kent v.
United States2 7 juveniles, like adults, were guaranteed the right to a
hearing on jurisdictional waiver questions 28 and the Court further indi-
cated that the adjudicatory stage of a juvenile court "must measure up
to the essentials of due process and fair treatment. '2 9 The Court also
questioned the justifiability of affording juveniles fewer procedural pro-
tections than are given adults. 3" Following Kent, the procedural due pro-
cess gap between juvenile and criminal court systems was narrowed sig-
nificantly by the landmark decision of In re Gault.3 t This decision held
that fundamental due process requires that a juvenile receive the right
to counsel, to timely notice of charges, to confront witnesses, and to
remain silent. An additional right was added when the Court declared
in In re Winship32 that a juvenile must be proved delinquent "beyond a
reasonable doubt." While these decisions indicate a distinct trend to-
ward more procedural requirements in juvenile courts, the Supreme
Court has stopped short of guaranteeing to juveniles the same proce-
dural safeguards that it has afforded adults.3 While the Supreme Court
was delineating certain procedural safeguards for juveniles the right to
a jury trial, not afforded juveniles, was being expanded in adult criminal
trials. The Court, in Duncan v. Louisiana,3 4 held .that the sixth amend-
by handsome fees they could receive for rehabilitating the rich. Third, the love and tenderness alone,
possessed by the white-coated judge and attendants, were not sufficient to untangle the web of
subconscious influences that possessed the troubled youngster. Fourth, correctional institutions
designed to care for these delinquents often became miniature prisons with many of the same vicious
aspects as the adult models. Fifth, the secrecy of the juvenile proceeding led to some overreaching
and arbitrary actions." DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28, 36-37 (1969). In many of today's
juvenile courts, overcrowding, understaffing, and the absence of legally trained judges is prominent.
McCune & Skoler, Juvenile Court Judges in the United States, Part I, A National Profile, I I CRIME
& DELIN. 121, 128-29 (1965). But see TASK FORCE REPORT 38.
26. In Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) the Supreme Court held that due process require-
ments must be applied to the admissibility of a 15 year old's confession when he is tried in a criminal
court. The Court said that immaturity of youth militated against comprehension and basic exercise
of individual rights. Accord, Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
27. 383 U.S. 541 (1966), noted in 19 VAND. L. REv. 1385 (1966).
28. Access to any probation office files on the youth and a statement of reasons for the
court's disposition of the case also were guaranteed to the juvenile. 383 U.S. at 559.
29. Id. at 562. See also Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
30. 383 U.S. at 551.
31. 387 U.S. 1 (1967), noted in 20 VAND. L. REv. 1161 (1967); see note 25 supra.
32. 397 U.S. 358 (1970), noted in 84 HARV. L. REv. 156 (1970).
33. The Gault majority quoted from Kent: "We do not mean. . . to indicate that the hearing
to be held must conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual
administrative hearing; but we do hold that the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due
process and fair treatment." 387 U.S. at 30.
34. 391 U.S. 145 (1968), noted in 21 VAND. L. REv. 1099 (1968).
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ment right to a jury trial in serious 35 criminal cases is a fundamental
right that must be recognized in state criminal proceedings. Buttressing
the Duncan decision in Bloom v. Illinois'3 1 the Court further extended
the right to a trial by jury to criminal contempt hearings that heretofore
had been considered civil proceedings. Since the Court in Duncan and
Bloom had reasoned that when an individual is faced with a serious loss
of liberty the authority and independence of the court does not take
priority over the right to a jury trial3 7 it appeared that the right to a
jury trial would be the next logical alteration of the juvenile court sys-
tem. Following Duncan and Bloom, however, two lines of cases devel-
oped dealing with the juvenile's right to a jury trial.38 The majority of
courts maintained the traditional approach and ruled that a jury trial is
inconsistent with the theory of juvenile court proceedings.39 On the other
hand, a vigorous minority disregarded the criminal-civil distinction of
the juvenile system and held that the right to a jury trial in a delinquency
proceeding is a fundamental element of due process." In the face of this
split of authority, the Supreme Court set a hearing for the McKeiver
appeal."
In the instant case the Supreme Court initially determined that the
procedural due process safeguards developed by Kent, Gault and
Winship were based on the concept of fundamental fairness to the juven-
ile during the fact-finding process and that the absence of a jury does
35. When the possible penalty exceeds 6 months imprisonment, the offense is regarded as
.serious" and a right to a jury trial exists. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970). The Court
in Duncan did not discuss whether a juvenile proceeding was "serious" enough to require a jury
trial.
36. 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
37. Seeid. at211.
38. Twenty-nine states specifically deny the right to a jury trial in a juvenile delinquency
proceeding, while 10 provide for a jury trial in certain circumstances. The state statutes are set forth
in the instant decision at 403 U.S. 528, 548 n.7 (1971). States that do not have statutes resolving
the jury question generally have held against the right of jury trial in a juvenile proceeding. See,
e.g., In re Fletcher, 251 Md. 520, 248 A.2d 364 (1968); In re Perham, 104 N.H. 276, 184 A.2d 449
(1962).
39. See, e.g., People v. Fucini, 44 Il. 2d 305, 255 N.E.2d 380 (1970); Bible v. State, 254
N.E.2d 319 (Ind. 1970); State v. Turner, 253 Ore. 235, 453 P.2d 910 (1969).
40. See, e.g., Nieves v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Peyton v. Nord,
78 N.M. 717,437 P.2d 716 (1968).
41. The Supreme Court previously faced this specific question in DeBacker, but sidestepped
the issue by saying that DeBacker was decided at the juvenile court level prior to the Duncan
decision. Therefore, there was no controversy at that time. Four of the 7 state supreme court justices
in DeBacker believed denial of the right to trial by jury in juvenile cases was unconstitutional;
however, 5 justices were needed to declare the Indiana statute unconstitutional. 396 U.S. at 30
(1969) (per curiam).
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not violate the fairness principle. 2 Recognizing the failures and disap-
pointments of the present juvenile system with regard to the ultimate
goals of rehabilitation, the Court decided that requiring a jury trial
might remake the juvenile proceeding into a complete adversary process
with its attendant delay and formality and with the additional possibility
of a public trial. This outcome, the majority determined, would effec-
tively end the juvenile system's idealistic prospect of an intimate, infor-
mal, protective hearing.43 Turning to the sixth amendment argument, the
majority found that the Constitution only guarantees a right to a jury
trial in criminal proceedings. Since the Court decided that a juvenile
delinquency proceeding should not be equated with a criminal trial, it
concluded that there is no constitutional requirement for states to afford
the right of a jury trial to juveniles in a delinquency proceeding. 5 In a
dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas46 reiterated an earlier dissent4 7 in
which he contended that Gault and Duncan require a juvenile to be
guaranteed the right to a jury trial when the delinquency charge is an
offense for which an adult would be granted the right to a jury trial.
The instant decision represents a departure from the recent trend of
providing juveniles in delinquency proceedings the same constitutional
42. "We would not assert, however, that every criminal trial-or any particular trial-held
before a judge alone is unfair or that a defendant may never be as fairly treated by a judge as he
would be by a jury." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968). The instant Court emphasized
that the states had a privilege of using a jury and that a juvenile judge could employ an advisory
jury in any case. There was also a strong plea for state experimentation with the juvenile system.
See generally Young, Due Process and the Rights of Children, 18 Juv. CT. JUDGES J. 102 (1967).
43. It also was noted that the President's TASK FORCE REPORT and other juvenile council
and uniform law recommendations specifically stopped short of proposing the jury trial for juvenile
proceedings. See, e.g., UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT AcT § 24(a). The Court further noted S. REP.
No. 91-620, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 13-14 (1969), which recommended the abolition of juvenile jury
trials in the District of Columbia.
44. The Court noted distinctions between the criminal and juvenile court systems set forth
in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision: (1) judges take a different view of their role in a
juvenile proceeding; (2) the juvenile system has available and utilizes more fully the various diagnos-
tic and rehabilitative services than does the criminal process; (3) the end result of a declaration of
delinquency is significantly different from and less onerous than a finding of criminal guilt; and
(4) the right to jury trial would be most disruptive of the unique nature and flexibility of the juvenile
court. 438 Pa. at 344, 265 A.2d at 355.
45. Justice Blackmun announced the majority opinion and Justice Harlan concurred on the
ground that criminal jury trials were not constitutionally required of the states by the sixth or
fourteenth amendment. Justice Harlan based his opinion on his dissent in Duncan. Justice Brennan
concurred except for the North Carolina decision, In re Burrus, because he felt the North Carolina
court had violated due process by denying a public hearing. See note 10 supra.
46. Justice Douglas was joined by Justices Black and Marshall. The dissent placed great
emphasis upon the fact that the appellants faced as much as 2 to 10 years in a reformatory or prison.
Justice Douglas also added an appendix by a Rhode Island juvenile judge that rebutted many of
the practical arguments against granting a jury trial.
47. DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28, 35 (1969).
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guarantees that are provided adults in criminal trials. In limiting the
Kent-Gault- Winship rationale the Court assumed a conflict between
affording juveniles a right to a jury adjudication of "delinquency" and
preserving the status quo of the flexible, yet disappointing, juvenile court
system. Choosing to preserve the existing juvenile court system48 over the
rights of the child, the Court based its decision on the proposition that
the right to a jury trial would not solve the myriad problems besetting
juvenile justice and would reduce the flexible rehabilitative nature of
delinquency proceedings.4 Arguably, a type of informal protective pro-
ceeding without the inappropriate trappings of an adversary process is
advisable for youthful lawbreakers.5 0 It is submitted, however, that such
a system can be maintained with greater efficacy and perhaps additional
justice 1 by superimposing the right to a jury trial on the adjudicative
hearing. Since the bifurcated nature of juvenile proceedings would insu-
late the jury from the dispositional phase, objective and accurate fact-
finding during the adjudicative phase of the delinquency proceeding is
possible without infringing on the flexibility and experimentation availa-
ble in the dispositional phase. Using a relatively small, 52 functional jury
upon the extremely infrequent request 53 from a juvenile would not be an
impediment to the juvenile court judge's determination of the best ap-
proach for rehabilitation. 4 That the system's flexible format can be
48. A decision to require juvenile jury trials would have forced at least 29 states to revise
their juvenile court acts and possibly experiment and improve them. See note 39 supra. See generally
TASK FORCE REPORT.
49. For a criticism of similar reasoning used by the lower court see Comment, Juvenile
Criminal Last, and Procedure, 16 VILL. L. REV. 362 (1970). See also Note, Juvenile Courts-Juries
in the Juvenile System? 48 N.C. L. REv. 666 (1970).
50. See Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REv. 547 (1957). But see
Tenney, The New Dilemma in the Juvenile Court, 47 NEB. L. REv. 67 (1968).
51. See 35 ALBANY L. REV. 849 (1971).
52. There is no requirement to impanel 12 jurors. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
An interesting question arises concerning the right to trial by a jury of one's peers. According to
the appendix in the instant case, a jury in a juvenile proceeding would not necessarily have to be
composed of other juveniles. 403 U.S. at 5. Generally voting-age citizens would constitute a juvenile
jury panel. See In re Grilli, 110 Misc. 45, 179 N.Y.S. 795 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
53. The Public Defender Service and the Neighborhood Legal Services Program of the
District of Columbia filed a brief amicus curiae in which they reported a survey of the 10 states
requiring jury trials with showed that of 30 juvenile courts processing about 75,000 cases a year, in
only 4 courts had there been more than 15 jury trial requests in the past five and one-half years.
403 U.S. at 561-62. See also Burch & Knaup, The Impact of Jury Trials Upon the Administration
oj Juvenile Justice, 4 CLEARINGHOuSE REv. 345 (1970). Most delinquency proceedings have a valid
confession. TASK FORCE REPORT 33.
54. See note 5 supra. The argument could be made that a jury would pre-empt the juvenile
judge's options in deciding upon rehabilitation. For example, if a jury finds that a juvenile assaulted
and injured his schoolmate and the state law requires a minimum sentence of 5 years in prison for
such offense, is the juvenile court bound by the criminal sanction statute? This argument can be
1971]
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preserved is evidenced sufficiently by the successful administration of
juvenile courts in the ten states that provide the right to a jury trial.5 -
Admittedly, a jury trial is accompanied by a certain amount of delay
and procedural formality, but administrative inconvenience is secondary
to the assurance of a fair adjudication of "delinquency." By relying on
the preservation of administrative convenience the Court ignored the
most critical issue-the rights of the child. 6 Although accepting the
simplistic view that a child has less rights than an adult, the Court failed
to define those rights. This failure, combined with the variance in state
juvenile court statutes, ultimately will require the Supreme Court to
resolve in piecemeal fashion all state controversies over the constitution-
ally guaranteed safeguards in juvenile delinquency proceedings. In addi-
tion, its failure to define the rights of children has effectively postponed
further application of procedural due process in state juvenile courts as
evidenced by the Ninth Circuit's recent refusal to allow a juvenile the
right to bail.5 7 Continued extension of procedural safeguards to juvenile
courts remains improbable until the Court recognizes that any proceed-
ing which may lead to an individual's loss of liberty is in the nature of
a criminal proceeding to which the sixth amendment guarantees the right
of a jury trial. By choosing to ignore the factual effect of delinquency
adjudication, the Court has relegated the child to continue in a system
of de facto incarceration. Although admitting the need for reform, the
Court, unfortunately, exalted the theory of the system and ignored the
realities facing the child who is adjudged "delinquent." What is best for
the child is the raison d'Ptre for the juvenile delinquency proceeding, 5'
and until the rights of children are delineated and enforced by the courts,
juveniles must face an imperfect system without the protection of indi-
vidual rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
countered by the phased nature of the juvenile system. Once a child is determined "delinquent" in
the adjudicative phase, the juvenile judge than can assume complete prerogative on the course of
rehabilitation in the dispositional phase.
55. See note 38 supra.
56. "[T]here may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds:
that he gets neither the protection accorded to adults nor the solicitious care and regenerative
treatment postulated for children." Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541,556 (1966). See also TAsK
FORCE REPORT 8, 23.
57. Kinney v. Lenon, No. 25, 522 (9th Cir., Aug. 13, 1971) (cited McKeiver in denying the
right of bail).
58. See materials cited notes 14 & 49 supra.
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Constitutional Law-Search and Seizure-Warrantless
Wiretapping of Suspected Domestic Dissident Group's
Conversations Violates Fourth Amendment
The United States, ordered by respondent district court1 to make
full disclosure to one defendant 2 of the content of his monitored conver-
sation 3 petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel vacation of the
order. The monitored conversation was overheard by federal agents dur-
ing the warrantless wiretapping of domestic dissident groups. The
United States contended that, in cases in which the national security is
threatened, the President has inherent constitutional powers to preserve
and protect the government which exempt him and his agents from the
warrant requirement of the fourth amendment.' Respondent argued that
there is no national security exemption from the warrant requirement
when federal agents conduct a search and seizure by electronic surveil-
lance of domestic dissident groups that are not affiliated with a foreign
power.5 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, held,
petition denied. When the national security is threatened by domestic
dissidents not affiliated with a foreign power, the President does not have
the inherent power to undertake a search and seizure by wiretapping of
the oral communication of these persons unless a warrant is first ob-
tained. United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan, 444 F.2d 651 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 403 U.S.
930 (1971).
Even though the framers of the fourth amendment were concerned
with unauthorized governmental intrusion into their homes rather than
with eavesdropping,6 case law and legislation have slowly recognized that
I. United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
2. The defendants had been indicted by a federal grand jury for destruction of government
property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1361 (1964). In pretrial proceedings, the defendants moved
for disclosure of certain electronic surveillance information. The Government revealed that one of
the defendants, Lawrence Robert Plamondon, had participated in conversations which were over-
heard by government agents. After an in camera inspection of the surveillance logs, the district court
ordered disclosure.
3. The wiretapping had been authorized by Attorney General Mitchell for surveillance of
certain domestic dissident groups. Defendant's monitored conversation was not the object of the
wiretapping.
4. The Government also asserted that even though the district judge found the wiretapping
to be iilegal, he should have determined in camera that the interceptions were not relevant, and
hence, not subject to disclosure.
5. Respondent also contended that since the disclosure order was a pretrial order, it was not
appealable and that a writ of mandamus cannot be substituted for an appeal.
6. See Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance by Leave of the Magistrate: The Case in Opposition,
118 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 170 (1969).
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a protection for private conversation is implicit in the fourth amend-
ment. In its first wiretapping case, Olmstead v. United States,' however,
the Supreme Court rejected the notion that wiretapping was prohibited
unless a warrant was first obtained. The Court ruled that conversation
was not protected by the fourth amendment unless there was an actual
invasion of the premises and held that since wiretapping did not involve
a physical trespass, there was no search for which a warrant was a
prerequisite. 8 Although in subsequent cases9 there was an erosion of the
physical trespass concept of Olmstead, it was not until 40 years later that
the Supreme Court in Berger v. New York' held that conversation was
protected by the fourth amendment and that the use of electronic devices
for the purpose of eavesdropping was a search within the purview of the
fourth amendment." Later that year, the Court in Katz v. United
States1 2 rejected the notion that the protection of the fourth amendment
was limited to searches involving a physical trespass upon the premises.
Finding that the fourth amendment protects an individual from unrea-
sonable invasions of his reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court
ruled that searches conducted without prior judicial ratification were
"per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment."'13 Accordingly, it
concluded that the warrantless wiretap of a telephone booth was a search
that required judicial authorization to be constitutionally permissible.
7. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
8. In response to Olmstead, Congress enacted § 605 of the Communications Act of 1934,
47 U.S.C. § 605 (Supp. V, 1970), which made it illegal for any person to "intercept and divulge"
the communications of another without his prior authorization. In construing § 605 soon there-
after, the Court held in Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937), that the executive branch
was subject to the prohibitions of § 605 and that any evidence obtained in violation of the section
was inadmissible in federal court. Since the Nardone court left intact the interpretation of the fourth
amendment propounded by the Olmstead court, federal agents could circumvent § 605 by continu-
ing to wiretap for investigative purposes as long as they did not divulge the intercepted communica-
tions. See Brownell, The Public Security and Wire Tapping, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 195 (1954); Rogers,
The Case for Wire Tapping, 63 YALE L.J. 792 (1954).
9. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963) (recording defendant's conversation by
concealed pocket wire recorder held not to be eavesdropping); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471 (1963) (statements made to police during warrantless search of house held to be illegally seized
as fruit of unlawful action); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (electronic listening
device that made physical intrusion held to be illegal search); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S.
747 (1952) (statements made into a hidden receiver held to be not illegally seized since no trespass);
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (use of detectaphone outside office wall held not
to be illegal seizure since it made no physical intrusion into the office).
10. 388 U.S.41 (1967).
11. In discussing the cases following Olmstead, the Court stated: "They [subsequent cases)
found 'conversation' was within the Fourth Amendment's protections, and that the use of electronic
devices to capture it was a 'search' within the meaning of the Amendment, and we so hold." Id. at
12. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
13. Id. at 357.
RECENT CASES
The Court, however, left open the question14 whether the Government
could intrude upon private conversation in national security cases with-
out being subject to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment.
Attempting to deal with this problem in compliance with the rationales
of Katz and Berger,5 Congress, in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act," set forth certain procedures for acquiring warrants for
electronic surveillance. Section 2518(7) of the Act permits federal agents
in emergency situations to eavesdrop for 48 hours before applying for a
warrant, and section 2511(3) acknowledges the constitutional power of
the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the
United States from unlawful or forceful overthrow. By enacting the
latter section Congress appeared to give its sanction to the inherent
powers doctrine. 7 Under that doctrine, not only is the President thought
to possess his express powers granted in article II of the Constitution,
but, in addition, is thought to possess a residuum of implied power' s
incident to his express powers, which he may exercise for the nation's
interest in times of emergency. Proponents of the doctrine have argued
that the residuum of power encompasses any power that is neither vested
in the legislature or judiciary nor expressly denied the President in the
Constitution. This concept of inherent presidential powers existing be-
yond those expressly provided in article II has been closely scrutinized
by the Supreme Court. The Court has recognized the existence of inher-
ent presidential powers in the sphere of foreign affairs,2" basing its deci-
sion on the express power of the President over foreign relations, 2' but
14. Justice Stewart, in the opinion of the Court, stated: "Whether safeguards other than prior
authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the
national security is not a question presented by this case." Id. at 358 n.23. Other members of the
Court were less hesitant to reach a conclusion on this issue. In a concurring opinion, Justice White
stated that prior judicial approval is not required when the President or Attorney General deter-
mines that electronic eavesdropping is reasonable to protect the national security. Id. at 363-64. In
a riposte to Justice White's statement, Justice Douglas stated in his concurring opinion that a strict
construction of the fourth amendment does not recognize a national security exemption--even spies
and saboteurs are entitled to fourth amendment protection. Id. at 359-60.
15. Title Ill of the Omnibus Crime Control Act was expressly written to conform to the
standards set forth in Berger and Katz. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1968).
16. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (Supp. V, 1970).
17. See S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 15, at 174 (individual views of Sen. Hart).
18. W.H. TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND His POWERS 140 (1916).
19. Id. at 140-41.
20. Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948) (presidential
orders regulating overseas or foreign air transportation upheld as within power of President to
regulate foreign affairs); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (New York law conflicting
with presidential compact with the U.S.S.R. held invalid); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.,
299 U.S. 304 (1936) (Joint Resolution allowing President to prohibit arms sales to countries in
armed conflict upheld as within President's power to regulate foreign affairs).
21. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304,316 (1936) (power of President over
external affairs is construed broadly due to his express power over foreign relations).
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in domestic affairs it has denied the existence of these powers except in
cases in which the executive exercise of power has been directly attributa-
ble to a specific constitutional grant of power.2 2 The leading case on the
inherent powers doctrine in domestic affairs is Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer. Rejecting the Government contention that Presi-
dent Truman's seizure of the steel mills during a national emergency was
within his inherent powers, the Supreme Court held that the President,
in the absence of statutory authorization, can exercise no legislative
power that cannot be reasonably traced from a specific grant of presi-
dential power in the Constitution. It should be noted, however, that only
two members of the Court, Justices Black 24 and Douglas,2 explicitly
denied the existence of any inherent legislative powers in the Executive.
Justice Jackson 6 disagreed and described the President's powers as
"fluctuating," stating that the constitutionality of an exercise of power
not directly attributable to a specific constitutional grant of power de-
pends upon a test with two interdependent factors: the exigencies in
which the power was exercised, and the congressional action in the area.
Because of this divergence of opinion, the Court was unable to achieve
a majority agreement on the existence or scope of inherent presidential
power and thereby left undecided the question whether the Executive
may use inherent power as a basis for wiretapping without a warrant in
national security cases. 27 Despite this lack of clear judicial support for
an inherent presidential power in the area of wiretapping, the executive
branch has assumed its existence and has interpreted section 25 11(3) as
authorizing an exemption from the fourth amendment warrant require-




22. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) (dismissal of civilian cook at naval
base for failure to meet security regulations is within power of President as Commander in Chief);
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (executive order establishing curfew for all
persons of Japanese ancestry within a designated military area upheld as within the war power);
Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875) (secret contract by President Lincoln for spying on
southern forces upheld as within his war powers).
23. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
24. Id. at 585.
25. Id. at 633.
26. Id.
27. Rejecting the Government's inherent power argument to make warrantless wiretaps in
national security cases, a federal district court has held that warrantless eavesdropping by federal
agents on domestic subversive organizations is a violation of fourth amendment warrant require-
ments. United States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424 (C.D. Cal. 1971). Contra United States v. O'Neal,
Crim. KC-Cr. 1204 (D. Kan. 1970); United States v. Dellinger, Crim. No. 69-180 (N.D. III. 1970).
28. Beginning with Franklin Roosevelt, every successive President has authorized the use of
electronic equipment for eavesdropping in national security cases. Comment, Privacy and Political
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The instant court reviewed 9 the history of wiretap litigation and
concluded that an electronic surveillance is a search within the meaning
of the fourth amendment and that a wiretap without a prior warrant is
"per se unreasonable" under the Supreme Court holding in Katz. After
examining the President's article II powers, the court could find no
express constitutional language to support executive exemption from
fourth amendment requirements in internal security matters. The court
then considered the claim of inherent power in the Executive to exempt
himself from fourth amendment requirements and concluded from its
reading of the Youngstown case that the President has no inherent power
to act in a legislative capacity even in time of emergency and, therefore,
has no inherent power to exempt himself from the fourth amendment.
Construing legislative action in the wiretap area, the court noted that by
enacting section 2511(3) of the Omnibus Crime Control Act, Congress
had provided a method by which the Executive could undertake wiretaps
without prior judicial approval in emergency situations and pointed out
that in the instant case the Executive had not attempted to use the
procedure that Congress had provided. The court went on to rule that
Congress, in promulgating the Omnibus Crime Control Act, had not
attempted to give the Executive any power that was not already granted
by the Constitution. The court also acknowledged the policy considera-
tions that were behind the implementation of the fourth amendment and
noted that its primary objective was to check the unreasonable use of
search and seizure by the royal sovereign. The court thought it anoma-
lous that the present Government would assert the power to search and
seize without prior judicial review, since it was the unreasonable exercise
of that very power which impelled the creation of the fourth amendment.
Freedom: Application of the Fourth Amendment to "National Security" Investigations, 17
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1205, 1217, 1221-24, 1236 (1970). Attorney General Mitchell has inter-
preted § 2511(3) as allowing warrantless eavesdropping on domestic dissident groups. Remarks
of Attorney General John N. Mitchell Before the 1971 Kentucky State Bar Annual Banquet, 35
Ky. ST. B.J. 26, 28-31 (1971); 56 CORNELL L. REV. 161, 163 & n.8 (1970). In defense of the
increasing use of federal data banks on citizens, the Attorney General has asserted claims similar
to the inherent power argument. For an excellent exposition by William H. Rehnquist, Assistant
Attorney General and recent Supreme Court appointee, of the Attorney General's position on the
constitutional and statutory sources of the executive branch's investigative authority see 117 CONG.
REC. 10225 (daily ed. June 29, 1971).
29. The court first disposed of 2 peripheral matters. See notes 4 & 5 supra. In the mandamus
question, the court found that a pretrial order is appealable by a writ of mandamus under the All
Writs Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1964), which provides appeal in exceptional cases. The court
determined that this case was exceptional since it presented an issue of first impression. On the
relevancy determination question, the court cited Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969),
as requiring disclosure to the defendant of any monitored conversation regardless of the apparent
innocence of the remarks.
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Finding no support for the Government's position in the express words
of the Constitution, case law, or statutes, the court concluded that the
President has no inherent power to exempt himself from fourth amend-
ment requirements when employing wiretaps against domestic subver-
sive groups.
30
The instant case represents the first decision at the federal appellate
level that has squarely faced the constitutional issue whether a President
can legally authorize warrantless wiretaps in investigations of American
citizens. The court realized that an adoption of the inherent powers
doctrine would invite abuses of executive power by removing electronic
search and seizure from prior judicial scrutiny, thereby preventing the
judiciary from acting as arbiter between the interests of the citizen and
the federal government. Without judicial scrutiny prior to the act of
monitoring, the only safeguard against indiscriminate wiretapping is the
Attorney General's discretionary power to grant or refuse authorization.
Under present political conditions, it would be difficult for any Attorney
General to differentiate between subversive groups that pose an organ-
ized threat to the security of the United States and dissident groups who
may appear subversive, but whose desire is to change the governmental
structure of the United States through legal means. One of the most
effective methods available to the Attorney General to discover the aims
of various dissident or subversive groups has been to order a wiretap that
will necessarily intrude upon the privacy of lawful dissenters .3 Thus,
even a responsible executive official is faced with the prospect of violat-
ing traditional fourth amendment protections. Far more dangerous to a
democratic society is the possibility that an Attorney General could use
an unbridled wiretap power to further the political aims of the adminis-
tration that appointed him, rather than to protect national security.
Indiscriminate use of this power could lead to the stifling of first amend-
ment freedoms under the guise of protecting the national security. Thus,
the court's holding confirms the fundamental principle that executive
30. Judge Weick, in dissent, stated that the court should have avoided the constitutional issue
by making a relevancy determination in the in camera proceeding. Relying upon United States v.
Clay, 430 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970), he stated that if the contents of the wiretaps were not germane
to any issue presented in a pretrial evidentiary hearing, then the court need not order production of
the wiretap logs. In response to the majority's opinion, he stated that the power of the President as
Commander in Chief and Chief Executive extends to both foreign and domestic subversives since
both groups threaten the existence of the government. 444 F.2d at 67 1.
31. The effectiveness of wiretapping to obtain evidence for criminal prosecution has not been
proved and the debate continues over its value. Therefore, the primary value of eavesdropping
appears to be in the area of intelligence gathering. See Schwartz, The Legitimation of Electronic
Eavesdropping: The Politics of "Law and Order," 67 MICH. L. REV. 455,498-99 (1969).
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authority is limited by the individual rights protected by the fourth
amendment.
32
Although the court reached the correct result in the instant case, its
reasoning is not compelling. By citing Justice Black's opinion in
Youngstown as authority for dismissing the Government's claims to
inherent power, the court adopted the view that the President has no
inherent power to act when there is a domestic threat to the national
security.33 Historically, the President has acted beyond the scope of his
express powers in domestic affairs in emergency situations.3 4 As Justice
Jackson pointed out in Youngstown, President Lincoln acted beyond the
scope of his express powers when he suspended the writ of habeas corpus
during the Civil War 3 5 and yet his action was sustained by the courts.36
It, therefore, is unrealistic to insist that the President has no inherent
power to act in the nation's interest in internal security matters. A more
useful and realistic approach to the problem of inherent presidential
power is Justice Jackson's "fluctuating powers" concept. 31 Under that
theory, the presidential power to act in situations like the instant case
must be balanced against the relative weight of two factors: congres-
sional action in the area, and the nature of the danger to the national
security. Following this approach, the soundest conclusion is that since
Congress established procedures whereby in national emergency situa-
tions a warrant could be obtained as late as 48 hours after instigation
of a wiretap, there was neither any need nor any justification for the
Attorney General's action in the instant case. The court would thus be
able to pay tribute to the historical existence of inherent presidential
power but, in addition, would be able to maintain the traditional role
of the judiciary as the final interpreter of the fourth amendment.
32. Recently promulgated ABA standards do not provide for warrantless eavesdropping
except to protect the nation from foreign powers or to protect national security information from
foreign intelligence activities. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 3.1 (1971).
33. The court expressly limited its holding to domestic threats to the national security and
did not decide what the President can or cannot lawfully do in his capacity as Commander in Chief
to defend the country from attack, espionage, or sabotage by forces or agents of a foreign power.
34. For a brief list of presidential actions taken to meet sudden crises see Brief for Petitioner
at 100 n.2, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
35. 343 U.S. at 637 n.3.
36. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
37. "Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or
conjunction with those of Congress." 343 U.S. at 635.
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Labor Law-Railway Labor Act-Section 2 First's Duty
To Exert Every Reasonable Effort Enforceable by
Injunction When No Other Practical Means of
Enforcement Is Available
Petitioner railroad sought to enjoin a threatened strike by respon-
dent union on the ground that during negotiations the union failed to
meet the reasonable effort requirement of section 2 First of the Railway
Labor Act (RLA).' Petitioner contended that section 2 First constitutes
a legally binding duty "to exert every reasonable effort to make and
maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working condi-
tions,' 2 and that respondent should be enjoined from any self-help mea-
sures until it fulfills this obligation. The union contended that sections
four, seven, and eight of the Norris-LaGuardia Act3 deprived the district
court of jurisdiction to enjoin self-help measures and that, in any event,
section 2 First does not constitute a legally enforceable duty. The district
court, declining to decide whether either party had violated section 2
First, held that the question was one for determination by the National
Mediation Board4 and thus was nonjusticiable. 5 It further held that the
Norris-LaGuardia Act deprived the court of jurisdiction to enjoin the
threatened strike. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that section
2 First is merely an exhortation to the parties stating the purpose and
I. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-64 (1964). The dispute between the Company and the Union originated
in 1959, when most of the nation's railroads began to reduce the number of brakemen on their
trains. The unions resisted these efforts, offering proposals of their own. The dispute went unre-
solved through national negotiations, arbitration under congressional dictate, as well as subsequent
bargaining on the local level. In the course of the bargaining, the parties held conferences pursuant
to § 6 of the RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1964), the National Mediation Board mediated the dispute
as required by § 5, 45 U.S.C. § 155 (1964), and the union declined voluntary arbitration provided
by § 5. For a full history of this "crew consist" dispute see Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United Transp.
Union, 422 F.2d 979, 980 & n.4 (7th Cir. 1970).
2. The entire first paragraph of § 2 provides: "It shall be the duty of all carriers, their
officers, agents and employees to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements
concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions, and to settle all disputes, whether arising
out of the application of such agreements or otherwise, in order to avoid any interruption to
commerce or to the operation of any carrier growing out of any dispute between the carrier and
the employees thereof" 45 U.S.C. § 152 First (1964).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 107-08 (1964). Section 104 prohibits the enjoining of a number of
specific acts including striking and advising or urging others to strike. Section 107 imposes certain
procedural requirements on the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes. Section 108 requires the
person in whose favor an injunction is issued to have made every reasonable effort to settle the
dispute.
4. For a discussion of the organization and function of the National Mediation Board see
note I I infra and accompanying text.
5. The opinion of the district court is unreported.
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policy of the subsequent provisions of the RLA, and is not a specific
requirement that is subject to judicial enforcement.6 On certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court, held, reversed. Section 2 First of the
Railway Labor Act constitutes a legally binding duty to exert every
reasonable effort to settle a labor dispute, and this duty is capable of
enforcement by injunction when no other practical means of enforce-
ment is available. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. v. United
Transportation Union, 402 U.S. 570 (1971).
Cognizant that prior railway labor legislation had been ineffective
in the settlement of labor disputes in the railroad industry,7 representa-
tives of management and labor met jointly in 1926, and drafted and
presented to Congress a proposed railway labor bill. After hearings on
the bill, Congress enacted it as the Railway Labor Act of 1926.8 Chief
among the RLA's enumerated purposes is the avoidance of any interrup-
tion to commerce or to the operation of any carrier.9 In order to accom-
plish that, the RLA establishes a bargaining process consisting of a
series of steps that the parties to a labor dispute must follow in the
settlement of their differences. Beginning with collective bargaining,"0 the
steps progress to mediation under the auspices of the National Media-
tion Board," to voluntary arbitration," and finally, to possible Presiden-
tial intervention." Although the right to use self-help measures is not
expressly included in the bargaining process, it, nonetheless, has been
judicially recognized by the Supreme Court in a recent decision that
upheld a railway union's right to strike after all of the RLA's procedures
had been exhausted without achieving a settlement." Consistent with the
RLA's underlying objective of promoting the voluntary settlement of
labor disputes with a minimum of governmental intervention, Congress
passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932. 5 Designed to curb federal
6. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 422 F.2d 979 (7th Cir. 1970).
7. See H.R. REP. No. 328, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1926).
8. 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-64 (1964)).
9. 45 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1964).
10. Id. § 152.
11. The National Mediation Board was established under the RLA as a nonpartisan body
that, in addition to mediating disputes, oversees the election of employee representatives by mem
-
bers of the various crafts and certifies the representatives so elected. Id. §§ 152 Ninth, 155.
12. If the parties do not reach agreement at the mediation stage the National Mediation
Board must try to persuade the parties to submit to arbitration. Id. § 155.
13. The President may establish an Emergency Board for the purpose of discovering and
reporting the facts of the controversy to him. Id. § 160.
14. In Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969),
the Supreme Court found that while the right to strike was not explicitly provided in the RLA, the
right to self-help was implicit in the statutory scheme.
15. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1964).
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court abuse of the injunctive remedy,'" it limits the issuance of injunc-
tions in labor disputes primarily to circumstances in which unlawful acts
are threatened or have occurred causing irreparable damage to a com-
plainant's property. 17 Even when clearly enjoinable acts have taken
place, however, section 8 of Norris-LaGuardia still requires the com-
plainant to show that he has made every reasonable effort to settle the
dispute. 18 Since injunctive relief has traditionally been the remedy sought
for violations of the RLA, the Norris-LaGuardia limitation on the in-
junctive powers of the federal courts has given rise to a direct conflict
between the policies of the two Acts. The Supreme Court, in Virginian
Railway Co. v. System Federation Number 40,19 recognized this conflict
and realized that it would have to make an accommodation with Norris-
LaGuardia if it wanted to give any effect to the violated RLA provision.
In that case the Court found a violation of section 2 Ninth of the RLA,
which requires a railroad to recognize the bargaining representative of
its employees. Upholding an injunction against the railroad's noncom-
pliance with this section, the Court pointed out that while the purpose
of Norris-LaGuardia was principally "to forbid blanket injunctions
against labor unions,"2 the general nature of its provisions, enacted in
1932, should not be construed to nullify the specific requirements of the
RLA, as amended in 1934.21 In International Association of Machinists
v. Street22 the Court followed Virginian Railway, but added the qualifi-
cation that injunctive relief should be used in a labor dispute only as a
last resort and only when no other relief will protect a complainant's
right.23 In addition to section 2 Ninth of the RLA, the Supreme Court
has enforced by injunction the section 624 duty to maintain the status quo
16. See, e.g., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & 1.R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
"The Norris-LaGuardia Act . . .was designed primarily to protect working men in the exercise
of organized, economic power, which is vital to collective bargaining. The Act aimed to correct
existing abuses of the injunctive remedy in labor disputes." Id. at 40.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1964).
18. "No restraining order or injunctive relief shall be granted to any complainant who has
failed to comply with any obligation imposed by law which is involved in the labor dispute in
question, or who has failed to make every reasonable effort to settle such dispute either by negotia-
tion or with the aid of any available governmental machinery of mediation or voluntary arbitra-
tion." 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1964).
19. 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
20. Id. at 563.
21. Id. Although the RLA was originally enacted prior to the Norris-LaGuardia Act, it was
amended in several important aspects in 1934. 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 48 Stat. 1185
(1934).
22. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
23. Id. at 773.
24. 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1964).
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during negotiations,2 and the section 2 Thirds requirement that neither
party interfere with or influence the other's selection of representatives. z2
Considerable uncertainty, however, surrounded the question whether the
section 2 First duty to exert every reasonable effort constitutes a legally
binding obligation capable of enforcement by injunction. While the
RLA's drafters seemed to agree that section 2 First did create a legal
duty, even they were not completely certain of its extent. For example,
during the legislative hearings on the bill, the chief union spokesman
explained at one point that the section 2 First reasonable effort duty was
meant to be judicially enforceable, 2 but at another point, he qualified
his position by stating that judicial compulsion would be appropriate
only when one of the parties absolutely refused to confer or negotiate. 21
Although it has never considered the legal effect of section 2 First stand-
ing alone, the Supreme Court has addressed the question of the section's
enforceability in conjunction with other sections of the RLA. In
Virginian Railway, the Court explicitly rejected the argument that sec-
tion 2 First did not constitute a binding duty23 It held that section 2 First
operated in conjunction with section 2 Ninth and that its effect was to
impose a binding obligation on the railroad, not only to recognize the
employees' representative, but also to exert every reasonable effort to
settle labor disputes existing between them. The strength of that reason-
ing, however, subsequently was brought into doubt when the Court, in
General Committee of Adjustment v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad
Co.,31 observed that section 2 First merely stated a general policy which
other provisions of the RLA buttress with more particular commands.
Recently, however, two federal circuit courts considered the question of
section 2 First's judicial enforceability and both suggested conclusions
contrary to that reached in General Committee. The Second Circuit
apparently assumed that section 2 First constitutes a legally binding
duty when it refused to issue an injunction against the union on the
ground that the union had met its duty to exert every reasonable effort
to avert a strike.32 Taking the same view of section 2 First, but in more
direct terms, the Fourth Circuit in Piedmont Aviation, Inc. v. Air Line
25. Detroit & T.S.L.R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142 (1969).
26. 45 U.S.C. § 152 Third (1964).
27. Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
28. Hearings on H.R. 7180 Before the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce,
69th Cong., Ist Sess. 91 (1926).
29. Id. at 84-85.
30. 300 U.S. at 544-45.
31. 320 U.S. 323 (1943).
32. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. Switchmen's Union, 292 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1961).
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Pilots Association,3 enjoined a strike on section 2 First grounds because
the union had failed to satisfy the reasonable effort provision.
In the instant case, the Court found at the outset that the parties
had exhausted the formal bargaining procedures of the Railway Labor
Act. Noting the railroad's claim that the union, nonetheless, had viol-
ated section 2 First by failing to exert every reasonable effort to reach
an agreement, the Court proceeded to determine to what extent that
section is judicially enforceable. It looked first to the Act's legislative
background, and observed that the chief labor spokesman at the con-
gressional hearings on the Act had stated that section 2 First was meant
to impose a legally binding duty.34 Marshalling additional support for
this interpretation, the Court observed that Virginia Railway had explic-
itly repudiated the argument that section 2 First did not give rise to a
legally binding obligation. In light of these considerations, the Court
concluded that the duty to exert every reasonable effort "was designed
to be a legal obligation, enforceable by whatever appropriate means
might be developed on a case-by-case basis." It concluded further that
in light of the legislative dissatisfaction with earlier mediation proce-
dures, section 2 First would be enforced, not by the National Mediation
Board as the district court determined, but by the judiciary.', Turning
to the question whether a federal court can enforce this duty by means
of an injunction, the Court observed that while the purposes of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act and the RLA sometimes conflict, an appropriate
accommodation of the two statutes could be made. Accordingly, it
found that even though the Norris-LaGuardia Act expresses a basic
policy against enjoining labor activities, federal courts have jurisdiction
to issue injunctions under the RLA when injunctive relief is the only
practical means of enforcement available. Justice Brennan, dissenting,
concluded that section 2 First constitutes a legal duty, but only to the
extent that it requires the parties to go to the bargaining table and talk
33. 416 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1969).
34. The Court quoted the chief labor spokesman as saying during the hearings that "it is
[the parties'] duty to exert every reasonable effort . . . to settle all disputes, whether arising out of
the abrogation of agreements or otherwise, in order to avoid any interruption to commerce. In other
words, the legal duty, the legal obligation is imposed, and as I have previously stated, and I want
to emphasize it, I believe that the deliberate violation of the legal obligation could be prevented by
court compulsion." 402 U.S. at 576.
35. 402 U.S. at 577.
36. ' The Court reasoned that since the duty is essential to the whole scheme of the Act, the
courts are qualified to determine-and do, in fact, daily determine-whether a party has acted
reasonably, and since the aggrieved party could not otherwise obtain relief because the Act did not'




to each other.3 7 Moreover, the dissent maintained that instead of recog-
nizing the justiciability of section 2 First, Virginian Railway held pre-
cisely that the parties involved were under a duty to recognize each other
and to begin the RLA's bargaining procedure. In conclusion, Justice
Brennan argued that the majority's reasoning would give rise to exces-
sive judicial involvement in labor disputes, contrary to the voluntary
settlement policy of the RLA, and that, as a result, the threat of eco-
nomic self-help, which plays a critical role in providing impetus toward
a settlement, would be lessened.
On remand, the district court held that not only had the union failed
to bargain in good faith, but that the railroad likewise had failed to
comply with the section 2 First requirement. The court reasoned that
although the railroad did not come before it with "clean hands,' '3 8 the
certainty of "grave and irreparable" damage to the public in the event
of a strike justified the issuance of an injunction. Concerning the point
in the bargaining process to which the parties should be directed, the
court found no authority to remand them to the National Mediation
Board, which is an intermediate step in the RLA's bargaining process.
Accordingly, it ordered them to resume negotiations at the initial collec-
tive bargaining stage.
The Supreme Court in the instant case attempted to dispel the un-
certainty connected with section 2 First's judicial enforceability. Here-
tofore, only the Fourth Circuit had directly held section 2 First judici-
ally enforceable,39 and its ruling'was subject to question because the
Supreme Court's comments on the same issue, if not clearly contrary
to the Fourth Circuit's conclusions, had been at least ambiguous. Now
the federal courts undeniably have jurisdiction to examine the conduct
of parties during negotiations under the RLA to determine whether they
have exerted every reasonable effort to settle the dispute." If the section
2 First duty is not met, the defaulting party may be enjoined from the
use of economic self-help measures such as a strike or lockout. 1 The
37. The dissent felt that this view had the support of the RLA's legislative history and focused
on a portion of the labor spokesman's testimony at the hearings in which he qualified his position
that section 2 First created a legal duty by saying that "if [the parties] refuse absolutely to confer,
to meet or discuss or negotiate, I think there is a question as to whether there might not be invoked
some judicial compulsion .... " Hearings on H.R. 7180, supra note 28, at 66. (emphasis added).
38. Although it made a passing declaration that its decision would not violate § 8 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, the district court did not discuss the explicit § 8 prohibition against issuing
an injunction in favor of a party who has not exerted every reasonable effort to reach a settlement,
but spoke only in terms of the familiar equity clean hands doctrine.
39. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
40. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570 (1971).
41. See id. at 582-83.
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enforcement of section 2 First, however, is not as clear-cut as that de-
scription might suggest. The Supreme Court quite simply did not achieve
what it set out to do and, as a result, section 2 First is surrounded with
as much uncertainty as it ever was. One of the major problems with the
instant decision was the Court's failure to characterize the standard
governing compliance with section 2 First. Under earlier interpretations
of the RLA, the courts determined compliance on an objective basis
-whether or not a party actually participated in the RLA's bargaining
process. As applied, it was immaterial whether or not a party had a bona
fide intent to reach a settlement without first resorting to self-help mea-
sures. Now, by virtue of the instant decision, the Supreme Court has
departed from that simple, but mechanical approach. Unfortunately, the
Court's only guiding standard for the lower courts was its observation
that section 2 First violations are limited almost entirely to cases in
which one of the parties manifests "a desire not to. reach a settlement. 4 2
The Court failed to describe in any meaningful way the objective indicia
of that standard, leaving the lower courts to their own devices to find a
feasible approach to the enforcement of section 2 First.43 The practical
importance of this omission is that the railroads and the unions are in a
dilemma: while they may now know that section 2 First is judicially
enforceable, they still do not know what course of conduct will constitute
compliance with its requirements. In addition to that dilemma, the in-
stant decision raises another problem. It creates a potential conflict
between the RLA's voluntary settlement policy and the enforcement of
the section 2 First duty. To find compliance with section 2 First, a court
must determine affirmatively that a party had a desire to reach a settle-
ment during the RLA's bargaining procedures. Since the objective stan-
dard of compliance utilized in earlier section 2 First decisions is no
longer controlling, the negative implication is that courts henceforth
must examine the subjective intent of the parties. As a necessary con-
comitant to this examination, it is submitted that courts inevitably will
have to inquire into the reasonableness of the disputants' bargaining
positions.4 4 For example, courts might have to determine whether a
42. Id. at 578.
43. The Court did seem to approve of analogies to cases arising under § 8(d) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964), which requires good faith bargaining, when these
analogies are made with great care and full awareness of the differences between the 2 Acts'
purposes. 402 U.S. at 578-79 & n. 11.
44. The Supreme Court, in Virginia Railway, noted that "whether action taken or omitted
is in good faith or reasonable, are everyday subjects of inquiry by courts in framing and enforcing
their decrees." 300 U.S. at 550. Although there is this suggestion that the Court would approve a




party's obstinance in pursuing a particular wage demand is justified in
the overall context of the negotiations. This judicial involvement in the
bargaining process is without precedent under the RLA. No matter how
carefully it handles the inquiry, a court will become intimately ac-
quainted with the specifics of each party's position and almost unavoida-
bly will show a preference for one. To the extent that a preference is
indicated, the court will confer upon the favored party's bargaining
position an unwarranted appearance of authority and will exert equally
unwarranted pressure on the other party to abandon its demands.
Clearly, that result would contain an element of coercion and would run
counter to the RLA's basic policy of the voluntary settlement of labor
disputes. 5 Despite these problems, the instant decision has some praise-
worthy aspects. It is sound in terms of RLA policy that it advances. Just
as the courts should not allow the purpose of the RLA's bargaining
procedures to be defeated by the parties' refusal to recognize or to
bargain with each other, they should not allow that purpose to be sub-
verted by less obvious means. Indeed, it would be senseless to compel
the parties to go through the bargaining process and not expect them to
do so with a desire to reach a settlement. The parties are now obliged to
do more than simply go to the bargaining table and talk. If a party fails
to negotiate with genuine desire to reach a settlement, the court can
enjoin it from utilizing the very self-help measures that it would like to
use to get the other party to soften its demands. In short, the court can
deprive a party of its principal economic weapon so that neither the
railroads nor the unions have anything to gain by subverting the RLA's
bargaining process. To the extent that subsequent disputes between the
railroads and the unions are resolved at the bargaining table rather than
by resorting to self help, the primary aim of the RLA is served. The
nation's commercial arteries remain open.
While the Supreme Court's approval of injunctive relief to enforce
section 2 First breaks no new ground, the district court's decision on
remand does. If it is permitted to stand, the decision will mark a signifi-
cant expansion of the federal courts' injunctive powers in labor disputes.
Section 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 46 prohibits the issuance of an
injunction in a labor dispute in favor of a party that has failed to exert
every reasonable effort to reach a settlement.17 Presumably, if the rail-
45. See, e.g., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W.R.R., 321 U.S. 50,58 (1944)
(policy of RLA to "encourage use of nonjudicial processes of negotiation, mediation and arbitra-
tion for the adjustment of labor disputes").
46. 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1964).
47. Section 8 has been given effect by the Supreme Court when it based a decision not to
enjoin a violent strike on the basis of that section. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Toledo, P. &
W.R.R., 321 U.S. 50 (944).
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road in the instant case failed to exert the requisite effort, section 8 would
bar the issuance of an injunction on its behalf, no matter what course
of action the union threatened to take. Nevertheless, reasoning that an
injunction was the only practical and effective means of enforcing sec-
tion 2 First, the district court enjoined the union from striking even
though it explicitly found that the railroad had not exerted every effort
to reach a settlement. Although this ruling flies in the face of Norris-
LaGuardia's express language, both judicial precedent and basic policy
considerations support the decision reached. When a court finds that
neither party to a dispute has exercised every reasonable effort to settle,
it must choose to give effect either to section 2 First of the RLA with
its inherent right to self-help or to section 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. In Virginian Railway the Supreme Court strongly implied that in
such a situation the policies underlying the RLA should take precedence.
Its basic reason was that the specific requirements of the RLA, as
amended in 1934, should not be rendered null and void by the earlier
general provisions of Norris-LaGuardia.48 Moreover, in terms of na-
tional policy, the economic consequences of a strike or a lockout in the
railroad industry are too severe to allow either to occur until the parties
have at least exerted every reasonable effort to settle their dispute as
required by the RLA.49
Even though the decisions of both the Supreme Court and district
court seem to vindicate the purposes of the RLA, the intricate problems
they raise suggest that the judiciary needs additional legislative guidance
in this area. There are several reasons for this. First, the Supreme Court
once again had to accommodate the sharply conflicting policy differ-
ences existing between the RLA and the Norris-LaGuardia Act. In the
absence of a clear legislative pronouncement, this conflict no doubt will
continue to plague the courts, and the courts no doubt will continue their
ad hoc process of reconciling the varying interests in question. At best,
that process amounts to nothing more than judicial speculation about
Congress's intent concerning the propriety of enforcing section 2 First
in a given situation. That approach is difficult to justify in view of the
critical interests at stake in nationwide labor disputes. Secondly, once
48. 300 U.S. at 563.
49. A recent Department of Commerce study estimated that if a nationwide rail strike were
allowed to continue for 30 days, the unemployment rate would rise by approximately 6.5 million
men and total unemployment would approximate 15% of the nation's labor force, the highest
percentage since 1939. The total cost of such a strike would be in excess of $25 billion. Joint
Hearings on H.R. 565 Before a Subcomm. on Railroad Work Rules Dispute of the House Comn.
on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 953-59 (1963).
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the courts determine that there has been a violation of section 2 First,
there is no provision in the RLA prescribing the stage in the bargaining
process to which the parties should be remanded. The district court
noted this omission when it ordered the parties back to the initial nego-
tiation stage instead of perhaps more wisely remanding them to the
mediation stage. If the RLA had clearly authorized the court to remand
the parties to the mediation stage, the resulting decision would have been
more in line with the Act's voluntary settlement policy. After negotiating
unsuccessfully through the RLA's protracted bargaining process, the
relationship between the parties is not likely to be harmonious. At the
mediation stage the aid of a skilled and impartial mediator would be
available to reduce the friction. His calming presence, therefore, could
substantially enhance the chances of persuading the parties to reach a
settlement. Finally, perhaps the most damning criticism of the RLA
goes to the very heart of the Act. Some have argued that the RLA is no
longer an effective mechanism to fulfill the purpose for which it was
designed-the settlement of disputes without interruption to railroad
traffic.50 To satisfy this latter criticism would require a substantial over-
haul of the Act, whereas the correction of the more specific problems
raised by the instant decision, in comparison, would require only rela-
tively minor changes. Whatever the extent of the changes, it is clear that
fresh congressional action in the railway labor field is presently needed.
Taxation-Deductions-Cost of Union Executive's
Campaign for Reelection Nondeductible as Business
Expense Under Section 162(a)
Taxpayer, president of an international labor union for sixteen
years,' claimed a deduction under section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code2 for expenses incurred during his unsuccessful campaign for reelec-
50. For a discussion of some of the criticism directed against the RLA and some suggested
alternatives see Risher, The Railway LaborAct, 12 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 51, 51-57 (1970).
I. International Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC (IUE).
Petitioner had served as an officer of the CIO from its inception until its merger with the AFL, at
which time he became an officer of the AFL-CIO. Concurrently in 1949 he was elected president
of the I U E, an office he held for 8 consecutive 2-year terms ending with the election here in question.
2. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a) allows as a deduction "all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred . . . in carrying on any trade or business .... " The Tax Court also
considered § 212 in conjunction with § 162(a), but, due to an earlier Supreme Court ruling that
§ 212 did not expand the types of deductions allowable beyond the scope of § 162(a), the court
held that § 212 could not compel a different result. McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 57, 62
(1944).
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tion. The Commissioner determined a deficiency in the amount of the
campaign costs, 3 asserting that taxpayer's expenditures were not neces-
sary and ordinary expenses incurred while carrying on a trade or busi-
ness within the meaning of section 162(a). The Commissioner further
contended that the presidency of a large labor union is an office of such
public interest that governmental support through allowance of a deduc-
tion for the cost of running for the office violates public policy. On
petition to the Tax Court, held, deficiency affirmed. Campaign expenses
incurred by a union executive while seeking reelection to the presidency
of an international labor union are not deductible as a business expense
under section 162(a). James B. & Margaret Carey, 56 T.C. 477 (1971).
Section 162(a) allows persons engaged in a trade or business to
deduct from their gross income the necessary and ordinary expenses of
producing this income.' Since neither the Code nor the Regulations fully
define a "trade or business," 5 it has been left largely to the courts to
provide a workable definition. In addition, the judiciary has borne the
task of determining what constitutes "carrying on" a trade or business.
Although the courts may characterize a man's line of work as a trade
or business, they have had difficulty determining exactly when he is
engaged in that trade.' This question has been particularly troublesome
when a taxpayer has sought to deduct the expenses incurred in changing
jobs or the cost of being temporarily unemployed. For example, al-
though it has been recognized that a taxpayer could be engaged in the
business of selling his services to others, 7 the Tax Court traditionally has
held that the very "seeking" of employment presupposes the nonexist-
ence of being engaged in a trade or business.8 On the other hand, it has
3. Taxpayer claimed as a deduction on his return a total of $16,070 expended in the cam-
paign, and the Commissioner took issue with $14,403.22. Taxpayer conceded that part of this
difference was due and the Commissioner conceded that the amount expended in defending a suit
brought against petitioner in his capacity as president concerning the election proceedings was
deductible.
4. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 162(a).
5. Groh, "Trade or Business": What It Means, What It Is and What It Is Not, 26 J.
TAXATiON 78 (1967). Congress has made one exception in this regard by providing that the perform-
ance of the functions of a public office fall within the "trade or business" term. INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954 § 7701(a)(26).
6. See, e.g., Mort L. Bixler, 5 B.T.A. 1181 (1927) (fair manager's traveling expenses between
fair sites held personal and nondeductible). Compare Raymond L. Collier, 23 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
804 (1954) (unemployed executive not carrying on a trade), with Harold Haft, 40 T.C. 2 (1963)
(unemployed jewelry salesman remained in trade).
7. Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940) (Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion noted
that a man could be in the trade of holding himself out to others as engaged in selling his specific
services).
8. E.g., Thomas W. Ryan, 28 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 506 (1959) (fees paid to law firm and
employment agency in seeking work disallowed); Leon Chooluck, 23 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 811 (1954)
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been held that a taxpayer with an already recognized status or trade
could deduct the expenses of "securing" work as a necessary cost of
plying his trade.' Thus, a welder, with a series of short-term jobs, has
been found to be continuously engaged in the trade of being a welder
and has been permitted to deduct the expenses of securing and traveling
to his next job.1 Similarly, in Harold Haft," the Tax Court ruled that
a temporarily unemployed salesman could deduct the expenses of main-
taining the contacts he had established during 21 years in the business.
More recently, in David J. Primuth,'2 the Tax Court concluded that a
corporate executive seeking a change of employers could deduct employ-
ment agency fees as an expense of carrying on his business of being a
"corporate executive."' 13 This construction of the phrase "carrying on
any trade or business" has been followed and expanded in subsequent
Tax Court cases." In contrast to this line of reasoning, the courts have
consistently employed a narrow interpretation of carrying on a trade or
business when a public office procured through an electoral process is
at issue.' 5 In the leading case of McDonald v. Commissioner,'6 for exam-
ple, the Supreme Court, drawing a distinction between "being a judge"
and "trying to become a judge,"' 17 held that while performance of the
(disallowed travel expenses from seeking employment as movie producer); see I.T. 1397, 1-2 Cui.
BULL. 145 (1922) which provides that "amounts expended ...seeking a position . . . are not
deductible .. "
9. E.g., Caruso v. United States, 236 F. Supp. 88 (D.N.J. 1964) (petitioner allowed to deduct,
as part of securing job, legal fees expended successfully seeking reinstatement as the guaranteed
top applicant for a civil service position); Riddle v. United States, 205 F. Supp. 357 (D. Colo. 1962)
(traveling expenses to solicit consulting work allowed engineer); see O.D. 579, 3 CuNt. BULL. 130
(1920) (allowed deduction of fees paid to secure employment).
10. Rev. Rul. 189, 1960-1 Cu.t. BULL. 60, 65-66.
I1. 40 T.C. 2 (1963); see Furner v. Commissioner, 393 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1968) (teacher who
returned to school to obtain master's degree was still in the trade of teacher).
12. 54 T.C. 374 (1970).
13. Id. at 379. Although the majority opinion characterized the taxpayer's trade as being a
"corporate executive," a concurring opinion would have restricted the taxpayer's trade to a "finan-
cial corporate executive" and the dissent narrowed it to employee of Foundry (taxpayer's prior
employer). Id. at 382, 384.
14. E.g., W. Richard Gerhard, 39 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1260 (1970) (allowed deduction of
individual expenses incurred in personally searching for employment); Kenneth R. Kenfield, 54 T.C.
1197 (1970) (deduction of expenses incurred in finding a new employer in same capacity allowed
although job offer subsequently refused and petitioner retained old job); Guy R. Motto, 54 T.C.
558 (1970) (petitioner was carrying on his trade of being an engineer when he incurred the deducted
costs).
15. See, e.g., McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 57 (1944); Mays v. Bowers, 201 F.2d
401 (4th Cir. 1953) (disallowed deduction of expenses that city councilman incurred in election).
16. 323 U.S. 57 (1944). Taxpayer had been appointed to an uncompleted term as judge with
the understanding that he would run for reelection at the term's end.
17. Id. at 60.
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duties of a public office may constitute a business,', the cost of a judge's
reelection campaign was not deductible as an expense of carrying on a
trade. 9 Although the decision was predicated largely on its narrow con-
struction of section 162(a), the majority opinion also mentioned the
public's distaste for an income tax deduction for campaign expenses,
20
which derives from a general fear of governmental subsidy of political
processes. 21 The extent to which this policy consideration actually influ-
enced the McDonald Court is unclear, 22 but the introduction of the
policy issue into a campaign deduction case raises the question whether
an existing public policy can defeat an otherwise permissible deduction.
When the Supreme Court addressed this question in Commissioner v.
Tellier,3 it held that the federal income tax is not an instrument for the
advancement of public policy and that a deduction must thwart some
plainly specified public policy to be disallowed. 2 The degree of specific-
ity required, however, has never been clarified. Moreover, the nature of
an office that would make it sufficiently "public" to invoke the policy
against deductions for the cost of procuring the office has never been
articulated. "Public office," for example, has never been held to include
an elected business representative of a labor union. 25 Thus not only is
there a question about whether the campaign costs of a labor union
executive are expenses within the meaning of section 162(a), but also
18. Id. at 59.
19. "[Ihe difficulty is not that petitioner's expenditures related to 'non-business' income
• ..but that they were not incurred in 'carrying on' his 'business' of judging." Id. at 62.
20. Id. at 62-63.
21. See Mays v. Bowers, 201 F.2d 401 (4th Cir. 1953) (city councilman's campaign expenses
disallowed). The general concern over election practices is evidenced by the fact that over the past
60 years Congress has acted several times to restrict political contributions in an effort to prevent
corruption in public office. See Federal Corrupt Practices Act, ch. 368, tit. 111, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925)
(codified in scattered sections of Titles 2 and 18 U.S.C.); Lambert, Corporate Political Spending
and Campaign Finance, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1033 (1965). See also INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 271,
276 (disallowing deductions for political campaigns, contributions, and debts owed by political
parties). Likewise, when Congress enacted § 7701 of the 1954 Code legislative history shows that
campaign contributions were expressly excluded. I Hearings on H.R. 8735 Before the House
Comm. on Finance, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1934) (states that the amendment has "nothing to do"
with campaign expenses).
22. The Court disallowed the deduction as not being within the language of § 23(a)(I), the
1939 predecessor of § 162(a), and treated the policy issues only in the context of its discussion of
§ 23(a)(2), the 1939 predecessor of § 212. The dissent felt that the decision was based partly on
public policy. It, therefore, is unclear to what extent the disallowance was predicated on public
policy.
23. 383 U.S. 687 (1966) (taxpayer found guilty of mail fraud allowed to deduct court costs).
24. Id. at 691; accord, Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467,474 (1943).
25. Ernest H. Vernon, 28 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 734 (1959), affd mem., 7 Am. Fed. Tax. R.2d
542 (196 1) (taxpayer was elected yearly as union's business representative).
RECENT CASES
about whether the "public office" policy is applicable against those
expenses, if they are found to be an otherwise legitimate deduction.
The instant court noted at the outset that taxpayer's claim for a
deduction under section 162(a) would turn on whether the Primuth or
the McDonald rationale should be applied. Briefly distinguishing
Primuth as having been based on different facts, the court held that the
nature of the expenses in the instant case were sufficiently analogous to
the campaign expenses at issue in McDonald to allow the court to follow
that case's rationale. The court, therefore, reasoned that the expenses of
seeking the union presidency bore little relationship to the performance
of the functions of that office and disallowed the claimed deduction.
Although the court had thus disposed of the claimed deduction under
section 162(a), they nevertheless turned to petitioner's argument that the
public policy considerations suggested by McDonald did not apply to
union elections. Noting the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclo-
sure Act of 195926 and citing its several sections dealing with union
elections,2 7 the court held that union elections were as important to the
legislature as public elections and concluded that the policy against
allowing expense deductions in political campaigns was fully applicable
to the instant case. Six concurring judges, 28 however, questioned whether
the Supreme Court actually had relied on public policy in McDonald,
and reasoned that if the principle announced in Primuth applied to the
instant case, then it was incorrect because the taxpayer's expenses were
not within the meaning of section 162(a). The dissenting opinions, fol-
lowing the Primuth rationale for their interpretation of section 162(a),
argued that election costs were an integral part of carrying on the busi-
ness of being a labor executive. One dissent also argued that an examina-
tion of the legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 revealed
no clear policy against allowing campaign-cost deductions. 29
In choosing the McDonald rationale the instant court apparently
has retreated from its expansive position in Primuth. In so doing, the
court has added further confusion to its prior interpretations of section
162(a). The prior difference in the interpretation of section 162(a), as
evidenced by Primuth and McDonald, was the result of courts' labeling
the taxpayers' trade or business with titles that varied greatly in breadth.
26. Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
27. ',3 Stat. 519, 533-34, 29 U.S.C. §§ 481-83 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
28. 56 T.C. at 485. The concurring judge was joined by the same 5 judges who joined his
dissent in Primuth. 54 T.C. 374, 384 (1970).
29. The dissent noted that the Tax Reform Act of 1969, while disallowing certain deductions
for policy reasons, did not mention election costs. 56 T.C. at 486.
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The Primuth court, by describing the petitioner as a "corporate execu-
tive," was able to adopt a sufficiently broad interpretation of carrying
on a trade or business30 that could encompass petitioner's efforts in
seeking a change of employers. In McDonald, however, the Court, by
narrowly identifying the taxpayer as a single-term judge, implicitly held
that when the judge's single term ceased, so did his identification with
the business of being a judge.3 ' Thus the choice before the instant court
was whether to entitle petitioner "labor executive" or "single-term
labor executive." In light of petitioner's long and active career in labor
unions and given the brevity of the presidency's elective term, it is diffi-
cult to see how he could be considered a labor executive or labor leader
for only as long as his term lasted; to do so would lead to the unrealistic
conclusion that taxpayer had been in and out of the trade every two years
for the past sixteen years.32 In the commercial-industrial world of labor
unions, periodic elections are so intertwined with continuous perform-
ance of executive functions that segmenting them seems to be an artifi-
cial delineation without substantive justification. Any test that purports
to set the limits of an income tax deduction should be in accord with
the broad purpose of income tax deductions to ensure that the income
tax is restricted to net income3 3 and should thereby serve the economic
function of encouraging the production of income. As a consequence of
this underlying purpose, the validity of any deduction, particularly a
business deduction under section 162(a), should be a question of eco-
nomic proximate cause. Does the claimed expense result from efforts
sufficiently related to the production of income to permit the deduction
of this expense from income before taxation? By not drawing an arbi-
trary distinction between performance and seeking the opportunity to
perform, the breadth of the Primuth interpretation of section 162(a)
permits consideration of economic proximate cause. Regrettably, how-
ever, the position taken by the instant court suggests that Primuth could
be limited strictly to its facts.3Y
Since the invocation of public policy to refuse a deduction presup-
poses an otherwise allowable deduction, the instant court's treatment of
policy must be treated as dicta. It nonetheless is disturbing dicta for it
30. 54 T.C. at 379.
31. 323 U.S. at 60.
32. See note I supra.
33. 323 U.S. at 66-67 (Black, J., dissenting).
34. See notes 13 & 28 supra. In view of the fact that the judges who concurred on narrower
grounds in Primuth concur also in the instant decision, as does the dissent in Primuth, it seems




suggests an unprecedented broadening of the policy against allowing
deductions for the expenses of a campaign for public office. The charac-
terization of a labor union presidency as a public office should not be
made without a full examination of the reasons behind the disallowance
of deductions of public-office campaign expenses. The policy against
deduction of personal campaign expenses '3 is predicated in part on the
view that allowing a deduction would discriminate against the poorer
candidate by giving his wealthier opponent a bigger tax break. 6 This
reasoning, however, is not wholly satisfactory since it merely recognizes
the impact of all deductions in a progressive system. Moreover, this
argument assumes that office seekers consider tax consequences of sig-
nificant importance when determining their expenditures; it is equally
reasonable to assume that the less wealthy may be encouraged to seek
an elective office by a deduction while the more wealthy are unlikely to
be deterred in any event. Perhaps the best argument against allowing the
deduction of personal campaign expenses derives from the fact that
elections conceivably can be bought, and although it may be difficult to
prevent this, there is no reason for encouraging it. The question in the
case of union elections, however, is whether the same danger of buying
elections is such a threat to the public that courts should apply the same
public policy against deductions of union campaign expenses. The in-
stant court looked to the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 195911 and its legislative history38 and concluded that there existed
a strong public interest in unions and that, therefore, union elections
bore the same relation to the public as public elections. At least one
judge, however, upon examination of the legislative history of the Tax
Reform Act of 1969, arrived at the opposite conclusion. When these
conflicting interpretations of legislative intent are considered in the light
of the Tellier 3 9 requirement that the deduction must be shown to thwart
a specified public policy before it will be disallowed, the wisdom of
invoking public policy in the instant case is questionable. Moreover, if
the concern of the policy is to eliminate discrimination between candi-
dates, use of the policy to deny union campaign expenses introduces an
equally indefensible discrimination between corporate and union activi-
35. There is also a policy against deductions of political campaign contributions, reflecting
the fear of individual influence over public officials; of course this does not apply to personal
expenditures. See note 21 supra.
36. Mays v. Bowers, 201 F.2d 401 (4th Cir. 1953).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 401 (1964).
38. H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959).
39. 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
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ties; although employer changes4" and proxy fights41 are deductible for
the corporate executive, analogous activities intrinsic to the operation of
unions, such as elections, now must be considered nondeductible.
40. David J. Primuth, 54 T.C. 374 (1970).
41. Graham v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 878 (4th Cir. 1964) (deduction of expenses of proxy
fight and attempted election to board of directors allowed).
